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In 1995, a massive bomb inside a rental truck exploded in the parking basement of the Murrah Federal 
Building in downtown Oklahoma City, sweeping half of the nine-story building away. It took the life 
of 168 persons. This incident is known as the ‘Oklahoma bombing’ and is, besides the attacks of 
“9/11”, one of the most famous terrorist attacks in the world. The vehicle bomb is one of the many 
attack modes that may be directed against a facility or individuals. (Hinman & Hammond 1997). In 
the terrorism prevention and protection task it is very important to look at the protection of the targets 
of terrorist attacks: buildings and/or urban structures with other functions. 
 
The vehicle bomb has much to do with design, because it causes the most material damage and 
causalities. It could be argued that threats even more devastating than the vehicle bomb may be 
conceived, such as aerial or nuclear attacks, but these threats are so structurally devastating to 
buildings that there is virtually nothing that can be done to mitigate the effects for civilian structures. 
Other threats, such as chemical or biological warfare, are neglected in this research because they do 
not cause material damage (Brown 1995). Because of enduring terrorist threats, it is important to look 
at how to protect countries and cities against possible other attacks. Protection against terrorist attacks 
can be found in urban planning and design. This research’s goals is to explore to what degree and in 
which way urban design can and, according to urban designers and the general public, may help to 
protect buildings and/or sites against terrorist attacks.  Because of the research program in which this 
research has been conducted, this research has been done in two countries: in the U.S.A. and in The 
Netherlands. 
 
Improvement of safety is the main goal of protection against terrorist attacks. But, the implementation 
of fences, bollards, Jersey barriers, and also extra security measures like police patrol and cameras, can 
also bring along some o ther (side) effects. In the implementation, it is easy for cities to forget the 
aesthetic part and sometimes it can look like they place the protection measures haphazardly; in their 
way of protecting they seem to forget that buildings and/or sites can begin to look like and feel like a 
fortress. Protection sometimes incorporates public space; space that used to be a pavement, a cycle 
path or a lawn. It used to be publicly accessible, but now it is incorporated by the protection measures. 
Also, roads can be (partially) closed off, or parking prohibitions can be raised. This influences the way 
pedestrians, cyclists or car drivers can use the building and/or site and may cause feelings of 
dissatisfaction. The fortress-like feeling can give feelings of insecurity, instead of feeling more safe. 
These (side) effects diminish the quality of life of citizens. The challenge and the quest in the operation 
of protection against terrorist attacks in urban design are to improve the safety, and try to keep the 
quality of life. Therefore it is important to find a balance between safety and the quality of life. 
 
To find out to what extent and in which way the U.S.A. and The Netherlands are implementing 
protection measures, case studies in Chicago, New York City, Washington D .C., The Hague, 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam have been done. A photographic research has been done, and where 






terrorism protection. Also, in Chicago only, a questionnaire has been conducted to get to know more 
information of users of affected areas. 
 
In doing case studies, eight different variables have been analyzed to compare the different case 
studies with each other. These variables are: symbolic and economic value, attention for design of 
protection measure, harmony with surrounding, effect for pedestrians and vehicles, creation of 
feelings of insecurity, and the effect for urban design. 
 
After having done the three case studies in the U.S.A, it has to be said that there is a difference in the 
design of the measures between the fact if it is a city owned facility or a private owned. In case of 
protection measures at private owned buildings, they seem to be incorporated more into the overall 
design of the building and the site. Even between city owned facilities in the three cities there is a 
difference. In Chicago, it looks like more time and money is spend on a proper layout and design of 
the protection measures. To explain this, one can say that the threat for a terrorist attack is not as high 
as in the two other cities, who both have been the scene for terrorist attacks on “9/11”. Because of that, 
in New York City and in Washington D.C. protection measures have been implemented rapidly and 
haphazardly. So, it seems that time, money and threat level can be held accountable for terrorist attack 
protection measures to look nice and to be in good harmony with the building they protect. That can 
be concluded if you look at the difference between the cities. 
If you look at the protection measures itself, it can be concluded that the effects they have for users of 
specific buildings and/ or sites differ in the type and design of the measures. This is also a result of the 
site they are implemented in, what means the difference between the way people used to use the site 
and the way they can or have to use it now because of the implementation of the measures. Nice 
looking planters, or small bollards of a proper stylish material do not necessarily have to look like they 
are protection measures.  
 
The three case studies in The Netherlands have shown that also in The Netherlands, the protection 
measures differ as they differ in being implemented to protect state-owned or private objects. 
Although it has never been said, it looks like the examples of private parties implementing protection 
measure have more money to spend on this. The measures are all incorporated into the design of the 
site or building properly, and do not really hinder any ones ability to move around the site or use the 
site freely. The two examples of ‘serious’ protection measures are the U.S. embassy in The Hague and 
the U.S. consulate in Amsterdam. This is not very remarkable, because we have learned from earlier 
case studies done in the U.S.A. that most of the protection measures at stake here are of a serious kind 
as well. The Dutch examples both incorporate public space, and have far reaching consequences for 
the users of these sites or buildings. Although it has not been measured or researched, accepted can be 
that these measures make you feel uncomfortable at least. All of these case studies in The Netherlands 
have also shown, just like the case studies in the U.S.A. that the effect they have for pedestrians, 
cyclists or car drivers, depends on the way of implementation, the design and the size. If they are 
integrated into to overall design of the site to a certain degree, the effect is less than if they are placed 




  XI 
 
Urban design as a protection measure can surely contribute to an increase in safety. It prevents vehicle 
bombs from coming too close to a building and/or site. Or, it can harden the target. In the case of a 
bomb going off, the result will be minimized, because a hardened wall will break the blast. This 
increases the level of safety. However, if only one building in a row is protected by physical measures, 
than it will only have an effect for that particular building. Not for the whole neighbourhood or area. 
The neighbour will also have to implement protection measures to protect his property against 
terrorist attacks. And, it will have to continue like that. Implementing measures at a site and/or 
building will only have the wanted effect on a larger scale, if more than one building in a 
neighbourhood will do the same. Otherwise, the attacker will move to your neighbour. 
By this means, implementing these measures will contribute to an increase in objective safety. The 
attacks will not have the result the attackers aim at. The protection measure reduces loss of life and 
property. But, objective safety is not the same as subjective safety. By implementing measures, people 
can also be made aware of a certain threat. Without the measures they probably would not have 
known that they are approaching a site and/or building at high risk of a terrorist attack. That can make 
them feel more unsafe. That is a difference between objective and subjective safety.  
 
In the U.S.A. the threat is conceived as higher, also because of their history of terrorist attacks on 
buildings and sites. And, maybe this legitimates their way of protecting buildings and/or sites at high 
risk. If we look at some examples in New York City and Washington D.C. the implemented security 
measures do contribute negatively to the urban design of these cities. They are not really designed 
nicely, and can easily make people more aware of a threat. This can decrease the subjective safety. 
Maybe, the physical protection measures discussed in these examples could be designed better, and 
by this means fit better into the existing situation. If the protection measures do less look like as being 
protection measures, than maybe people feel less unsafe and are less aware of a present threat. 
For example, a jeweller in Rotterdam has implemented stylish artful anti-ram bollards in front of his 
shop. They do not really look like protection measures. The threat of being attacked is far less than 
certain buildings on Wall Street, but the same protection measures could be implemented there as 
well. The Netherlands is doing well in implementing protection measures. That is obviously a 
consequence of a threat that is lower than is the U.S.A., but the measures that are implemented in The 
Netherlands look like they fit better into the overall design of the building and site. Only two 
examples are exceptional. In The Hague and in Amsterdam two buildings are to the utmost protected 
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1  Background and goal of the research 
 
1.1  Terrorist attacks 
Everybody still remembers it. In 2001, Tuesday September 11th, two hijacked planes crashed into the 
north and south tower of the World Trade Centre in New York, U.S.A. The two towers collapsed and 
several other buildings in the surroundings were in danger of collapsing or had major structural 
damage. On the same day, two other planes got hijacked and crashed as well, one into the Pentagon in 
Washington D.C. and the other in a rural town called Somerset County, Pennsylvania. In total 2749 
people were killed by these terrorist attacks on “9/11” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States 2004). This is by far the most famous incident of terrorist attacks in the United 
States, and throughout the whole world. But, it is not the only case of terrorist attacks the United 
States had to deal with. In 1993, the World Trade 
Centre in New York was a target of terrorist 
attacks for the first time, which demanded 6 lives 
and thousand of injuries. Another incident is 
known as ‘the Oklahoma bombing’. In 1995, a 
massive bomb inside a rental truck exploded in 
the parking basement of the Murrah Federal 
Building in downtown Oklahoma City, 
sweeping half of the nine-story building away 
(see figure 1.1), which took the life of 168 persons 
(Hinman & Hammond 1997). 
Figure 1.1 The Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma  
City after the bombing of April 19th, 1995 (source:  
Oklahoma Bombing Investigation Committee 1999) 
 
Acts of terrorism as it reveals these days are not new. It is rooted in anarchism, which was at its top at 
the end of the 19th century with the attack on Czar Nicolas 2nd   (Campbell & Flournoy 2001). In the 20th 
century terrorism became more and more a way for nationalistic groups to strive for independence. 
The most famous examples of terrorist organizations throughout the world are, because of their 
disastrous attacks, The Bask Separatist Movement ETA (‘Euskadi ta Askatasuna’), the IRA (Irish 
Republican Army) and the Islamite Fundamentalist Group named Al Qaeda. As for all terrorist 
organizations, to reach their goals they are unpredictable and go really far. Hundreds of innocent 
people suffer each time from these terrorist organizations.  
Whereas terrorist organizations work together to increase the effectivity of their actions, governments 
all over the world work together to compete these actions effectively. This attempt for cooperation 
goes back to 1937, when in Switzerland several governments tried to gain an international partnership 
in competing terrorism (Combs 1997). However, for a long time they didn’t manage to reach an 
agreement. The main reason seems to be that different countries share different values and beliefs 
about what terrorism is. What from the point of view of the victims is seen as a terrorist attack, can be 
a righteous action in striving for freedom in the eyes of the terrorists. Only in 1977 they succeeded in  
  




gaining a convention on a European level. One week before “9/11” the European Parliament agreed 
consensus about a more intensive competition against terrorism (Van Leeuwen 2003).  
In the fight against terrorism it is very important to compete the source of terrorism: the terrorist 
organization and the terrorist itself. This is possible through improved protection measures like more 
police control and more security devices like cameras and entrance screenings. Filtering out tries to 
avoid more actions from terrorists. But, besides these ways of protection, it is also very important to 
look at the protection of the targets of terrorist attacks: buildings and/or urban structures with other 
functions. Because of improved technology and knowledge about how to use it in a correct way, we 
live in an era where we have the capabilities to improve those aspects of the urban landscape that 
cause concern. As humans, we respond to environmental cues created by the built and natural 
environment. Planners and designers can be held responsible for the standards, policies, and 
guidelines that direct the way in which our environments are designed and built; the very same 
environments that affect the way we behave and feel (National Capital Planning System 2002). They 
are trained to integrate an array of considerations into our daily practice and strive to recognize our 
potential impact on creating safe places. Like transportation, economics and urban design, it is worth 
considering public safety and terrorist attack protection measures in the development and 
implementation of general plan policy, design guidelines, and development review.  
Protecting yourself from danger is a basic human instinct that can result in a lot of different 
manifestations (Jacobs 1961). Today's society is so preoccupied with safety and how to deal with 
terrorist attacks so as to not become a victim that we are on a seemingly limitless quest for the ultimate 
terrorism prevention solution. This quest is fuelled by what we constantly see and hear about 
terrorism on TV, the radio, the newspaper and the Internet. In the press we are confronted with "hard" 
news about terrorism, where the biggest issue is how to defeat the terrorists. But, because of enduring 
terrorist threats, it is even more important to look at how to protect countries and cities against 
possible other attacks. Protection against terrorist attacks can be found in urban planning and design. 
That’s what this research is about.  
 
 
1.2  Dealing with terrorist attacks: a planner’s perspective 
Planners and designers started to think about the idea that modification of the physical environment 
could have an impact on crime by eliminating opportunities for crimes to be committed, starting with 
Jacobs' The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), Newman's Defensible Space (1972) and Jeffrey's 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (1977). Today these principles could also work for the 
protection of terrorist attacks. The idea is that in some cases the physical environment could be held 
accountable for the succeeding of some of the terrorist attacks and undesirable activities occurring in 
cities and its downtowns and that some disasters could have been prevented if only more protection 










After “9/11” the U.S.A. has established a ‘National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States’, which has formulated a ‘Global Strategy’ for protection against terrorist attacks. One aspect of 
this strategy is protection of the targets of terrorist attacks, which include urban structures. This is 
known as target hardening. Today, especially after “9/11”, Americans live with a heightened 
awareness of how weak their safety can be and their trust in the stability of the public environment 
can suddenly be shaken as security is diminishing. Citizens, therefore, may expect increased 
protection for themselves and for their environment (National Capital Planning System 2002). 
Washington D.C., with federal facilities like the White House and the U.S. Capitol, has already been 
protected for many years, which increased after “9/11”.  Temporary barrier blocks and other 
fortifications have become familiar in the streetscapes of Washington D.C. Unfortunately at the 
expense of the openness, 
accessibility and comfort within 
the public domain (National 
Capital Planning System 2002). 
Therefore, an ‘Urban Design and 
Security Plan’ has been 
developed for Washington D.C. 
(see figure 1.2). The idea is that 
urban design and good security 
can exist together.  
 
Figure 1.2 The different protection areas of Washington D.C. 
(source: National Capital Planning System 2002) 
 
While the plan applies to federal facilities and has been prepared specifically for Washington D.C., its 
principles can also be applied to other cities. The illustration of Washington D.C. is just an example of 
a city which has incorporated terrorist attack protection measures into urban design. It happens in 
more cities throughout the U.S.A., and also countries in Europe have to deal with this already for a 
long time, due to attacks by ETA and IRA.  
 
 
1.3  The vehicle bomb as research objective 
Bombings are one of the most traditional ways to commit acts of terrorism. The vehicle bomb is only 
one of the many attack modes that may be directed against a facility or individuals. Some other forms 
of attack include mob attack, kidnappings, poison gas attack, sniper attack, and mail bombs (Hinman 
& Hammond 1997). However, from the standpoint of urban design, the large-scale vehicle bomb has 
much to do with design, because it has caused the most material damage and causalities. 
The blast from a vehicle bomb produces high, relatively uniform pressures and impulses over a large 
area of adjacent structures. This loading can result in collapse of nearby structures. Such an explosion 
produces extensive glass breakage. A confined explosion, such as one in a parking garage or basement 
(as happened in the case of the Oklahoma bombing), can result in catastrophic collapse of the  
  




structure through the effects of the direct blast loading and the quasi-static pressure developed in the 
closed space (Conrath 1999). Vehicle bombs have an additional advantage of being able to bring a 
large quantity of explosives to the doorstep of the target, undetected. Finally, the dramatic component 
of explosions, in terms of the destruction they cause, creates a media sensation that is highly effective 
in transmitting the desired message of the terrorist to the public.  
It could be argued that threats even more devastating than the vehicle bomb may be conceived, such 
as aerial or nuclear attacks, but these threats are so devastating to buildings that there is virtually 
nothing that can be done to mitigate the effects for civilian structures. Other threats, such as chemical 
or biological warfare, are neglected in this research because they do not cause material damage. 
Although it is possible that the threat may change in the future, bombings have historically been a 




1.4  The problem 
Improvement of safety is, of  course, the main goal of protecting against terrorist attacks. But, the 
implementation of fences, bollards, Jersey barriers1, and also extra security measures like police patrol 
and cameras, can also bring along some other (side) effects.  
In the implementation, it is easy for cities to forget the aesthetic part and sometimes it can look like 
they place the protection measures haphazardly; in their way of protecting they seem to forget that 
buildings and/or sites can begin to look like and feel like a fortress. Protection sometimes incorporates 
public space; space that used to be a pavement, a cycle path or a lawn. It used to be publicly accessible, 
but now it is incorporated by the protection measures. Also, roads can be (partially) closed off, or 
parking prohibitions can be raised. This influences the way pedestrians, cyclists or car drivers can use 
the building and/or site and may cause feelings of dissatisfaction. The fortress-like feeling can give 
feelings of insecurity, instead of feeling more safe. These (side) effects diminish the quality of life of 
citizens. The challenge and the quest in the operation of protection against terrorist attacks in urban 
design are to improve the safety, and try to keep the quality of life. Therefore it is important to find a 
balance between safety and the quality of life. 
 
 
1.5  Research goal and questions 
This research  has been conducted as part of the N.E.U.R.U.S. program. N.E.U.R.U.S. stands for 
‘Network for European and United States Regional and Urban Studies’ and is an exchange program 
between three European universities and three American universities. The idea for this research is 
originated during a period abroad from August till December 2004 at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign. One of the goals of this exchange program is doing a comparative research 
between the host and home country, respectively the U.S.A. and The Netherlands. 
 
                                                 
1 Jersey barriers are concrete traffic dividers used on freeways and road construction sites to separate 
and direct vehicle traffic. There are several types of traffic barriers, but Jersey-style barriers are the 
most commonly used (Roads to the Future 1997).  




This, basically descriptive, research gives a closer look on how terrorist attack protection measures are 
being incorporated in urban design principles, in the U.S.A. and in The Netherlands. 
Accompanied with this research is the following goal: 
 
The goal of this research is to explore to what degree and in which way urban design in the U.S.A. and in The 
Netherlands can and, according to urban designers and the general public, may help to protect buildings and/or 
sites against terrorist attacks.  
 
From this goal, the following questions, which will be the lead during this thesis, can be identified: 
 
1.  What can be done in urban design to protect buildings and/or sites against terrorist attacks, 
and what has already been done? 
2.  What, according to urban designers and the general public, can and may be done to protect 
buildings and/or sites against terrorist attacks? 
3.  How do users of affected areas regard these terrorist attack protection measures? 
4.  How can, all in all, urban design as protection measure contribute to an increase in safety?  
 
 
1.6  Research methodology 
Beforehand the methodology of the research will be explained, it must be said that terrorism here is 
seen as something invariable. Not all attacks have been done for the same reasons and with the same 
ideologies, but most of the time, the effects of doing it are the same. It is clear that every time many 
people have to suffer. So, this research does not pay attention to the reasons why the several attacks 
have taken place, but it will look at the situation after the attacks, the outcome, assuming that terrorist 
attacks take place. The research methodology can be divided into four phases.  
 
The first phase is the period of reading about the subject and designing the research during the first 
two months in the U.S.A., and the second phase is the period of the actual research on the part that 
has been accomplished in the U.S.A., the last two months of the stay abroad. Phase three is the period 
of doing research on the part about the Netherlands, and phase four encompasses analysing of the 
data and writing of the report. Phase three and four occur more or less at the same time. These phases 
will be outlined below: 
 
Phase 1 
The preparation of the research actually means a thorough literature review in the U.S.A. to get 
acquainted with the subjects of terrorism protection and target hardening. Almost all the literature has 
been collected in the U.S.A., since the University of Illinois had a lot more literature and knowledge 
concerning this study its topic. Also, designing the case studies has been done during the first phase. 
 
Phase 2 
This phase comprises the actual research that has been done in the U.S.A. This means doing an 
extensive photographic research in Chicago, Washington D.C. and New York, to get familiar with the   




concepts in reality; the first steps in the ‘field’. The unit of analysis of the photographic research that 
has been done in all three cities, is the actual terrorist attack protection measure, which has its 
sediments in urban design.  
The execution of the extensive case study has been done during this phase as well. In the city of 
Chicago interviews have been executed with architects of the City of Chicago Department of General 
Services and the Public Building Commission, to get to know more information from the officers who 
are responsible for the implementations in practice. Also, a questionnaire has been composed and 
conducted to get to know more information from a very important actor in this research topic: the 
users of affected areas. This questionnaire answers the question what the effects are of the 
implementation of terrorist attack protection measures for t he users of affected areas. This 
questionnaire has been done among users of the Sears Tower site, in the Loop, downtown Chicago. 
Difference has been made between people who live and work around this site day by day and people 
who visit this site as a tourist only once. The question form can be found in the appendices (A). 
 
Phase 3 
In the third phase research on the Dutch part has been done. In the three biggest cities in The 
Netherlands, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, a photographic research has been done. To get 
to know more information about terrorist attack protection measures in The Netherlands, 
interviews/discussions with officials from the municipalities have been executed. Discussed is the 
situation in The Netherlands, and questioned is the forecast of the same protection measures as can be 
seen in the U.S.A. The interviews/discussions are partially based on a selection of photographs taken 
in the U.S.A.  
 
Phase 4 
The final phase has existed out of analysing the data to write the thesis, which has taken place in 
Groningen, the Netherlands. Also, the comparison between the U.S.A. and The Netherlands, 
regarding the research question, has taken place, and important lessons to be learned have been 
identified to see whether the U.S.A. can learn from experience from The Netherlands or vice versa. 
Altogether this has led to the completion of this report. Further contents of the different chapters will 
be described in the following paragraph.  
 
 
1.7  Reading guide 
The contents of this thesis follow the different phases in which this research has been done. The next 
chapter (theoretical framework) describes the theoretical framework in which this study must be seen 
and has been executed. Among other things, the theory of Defensible Space and the concept of Crime 
Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) will be defined. This is meant to understand the 
concepts where this research has to deal with and provides the context wherein the central problem in 








Chapter three will bring up the basic principles in the field of urban design to protect urban structures 
against terrorist attacks, altogether with the underlying thoughts and a broader context in which these 
protection measures are being taken. Explained will be the concepts that can be found in practice. 
How can they be implemented and how does it function? 
 
Chapter four will present the methodology which will be the guide for doing the case studies in 
chapter five and six.  
 
Chapter five and six will look at this kind of terrorist attack protection measures in practice in 
respectively the U.S.A. and in The Netherlands. It will result in two overviews of the photographic 
researches that have been accomplished in the two countries.    
 
In chapter seven, the U.S.A. and The Netherlands will be compared with each other based on the same 
variables. These are the extend to where terrorist attack protection measures are being implemented, 
and the influences they have for the users of affected buildings and/or sites. Also, some 
recommendations for either the U.S.A or The Netherlands will be given and conclusions will be 







































2  Theoretical framework 
 
In trying to get a better understanding of the research topic, and to finally answer the research 
question, here the focus is on the theory of Defensible Space, which originates from Oscar Newman 
(1935-2004). According to this theory a city can defend itself physically against crime. Because of the 
research topic, it is worthwile to see if this theory also counts for a city defending itself physically 
against terrorist attacks. Does it share the same underlying thoughts? Together with the highlighting 
of a few ideologies drawn from a relevant literature review, in this chapter the theoretical framework 
of Defensible Space, in which this research has been conducted, will be given. 
 
 
2.1    Background of the theory 
The type of architecture can be held accountable for the fact that some buildings and neighbourhoods 
are more likely to produce an environment of crime, than other ones. To underline that statement, we 
have to go back to the period of modern architecture, first appearing at the beginning of the 20th 
century. According to Oscar Newman and Jane Jacobs (1916), one can say that structures, 
neighbourhoods or villages of modern architecture, can be seen as a type of architecture that is unsafe.  
 
2.1.1  Le Corbusier 
In the period of the modern architecture, Le Corbusier (1887-1965) and the International Congress of 
Modern Architects (C.I.A.M.) flourished, and the keyword seemed functionalism. The encyclopaedia 
says that modern architecture “rejected historic precedent as a source of architectural inspiration and 
considered function as the prime generator of form, employing materials and technology indirectly, 
rather than softening with ornament or façade” (Wikipedia; The Free Encyclopedia 2005). 
Le Corbusier was an influential architect mainly through his writing and his buildings, and although 
he did not really have architectural skills, his ideas on urban living strongly influenced post-war 
reconstruction. He had a strong opinion that the 20th century would be an age of progress, an age with 
engineering and technological advances, and new ways of living (Le Corbusier 1931). Only 
architecture did not go along with his ideas, as new creations kept being built in various historical 
styles. By 1918, his ideas on how architecture should meet the demands of the machine age led him to 
develop a new theory: ‘Purism’.  Purist rules would lead the architect always to refine and simplify 
design, without ornaments.  Architecture would be ‘as efficient as a factory assembly line’ and ‘a 
house is a machine for living in’ (Le Corbusier 1931).  Despite his love for machine aesthetic, Le 
Corbusier was determined that his architecture would reintroduce nature into people’s lives.  
Victorian cities were chaotic and dark prisons for many of their inhabitants. He was convinced that a 
rationally planned city could offer a healthy, humane alternative (Curtis 1986). The ‘ Ville 
Contemporaine’, stemming from 1922, is the first example of the effect of his ideas.   
 
After World War II, Le Corbusier got his chance to put his urban theories into practice, because 
Europe had big housing problems.  The Unite d’Habitation in Marseilles (1952) is a connection of three 
decades of Corbusian domestic and urban thinking. It had seventeen levels were 1600 people could 
live and it incorporated various types of apartments, shops, clubs and meeting rooms all connected by   




raised ‘streets’. Now a popular building for Marseille’s middle-class professionals, this ‘functional 
city’ was an example for solving many housing problems all over the world (Curtis 1986). But later in 
the 1950s, this form of architecture and planning came under severe criticism; the first signs of defeat 
of the modern movement. Influenced by Le Corbusier’s modernist vision of the Garden City, public 
housing projects are characterized by clusters of dominating high rises with large amounts of open 
space on super blocks closed to traffic, with little connection to the surrounding urban landscape. 
Green space around buildings is unbounded and undifferentiated, opening up to public streets and 
unrelated to a particular portion of a building or cluster of buildings (Newman 1972). The large green 
spaces on the ground were intended to provide a garden or park-like atmosphere filled with trees that 
would reconnect the resident to nature and provide space for community activity. The reality of the 
space in practice was that the grounds were not kept; they filled with glass and garbage, and were 
taken over by gangs and other criminal elements. Because too many families share the space, there is 
no sense of ownership or territoriality to protect and monitor the space (Newman 1972). 
After Le Corbusier died in 1965, the accumulation against modernism grew.  Local authorities on tight 
budgets, which often failed to understand the essential humanism (creating communities) behind Le 
Corbusier’s plans, copied his theories on urban renewal (Curtis 1986).  
 
2.1.2  Jane Jacobs 
Jane Jacobs had a strategy that was the opposite of the one from the urban planners from that age. 
Instead of the utilization of ideals to shape the future, she studied the real successes and failures, 
drawing on her experience of living in New York and working as an architectural journalist.  Her 
book ‘The Death and Life of Great American Cities’ (1961) was an attack on large-scale urban planning 
and a strong critique of the urban renewal policies of the 1950s which, she claimed, destroyed 
communities and created isolating, unnatural urban spaces. She drew attention to the tendency for 
crime to occur in the large publicly accessible areas created by the newer forms of planning well away 
from conventional streets, and she stressed the role of urban design and its role in community safety 
(Jacobs 1961). One of her targets was the abandoning of the traditional relationship of h ouses, 
sidewalks and street and its replacement with high-rise apartment blocks set in ‘parks’ along the lines 
of Le Corbusier’s ‘Radiant City’ thought up in the 1920s.  
Essentially, her criticism of new forms of design was that they broke down many of the traditional 
controls on criminal behaviour; the ability of residents to watch the street and the presence of people 
using the street both night and day. Jacobs noticed that streets, which are isolated, unused, and non-
functional, are unsafe streets, whereas streets that have both residential and commercial use twenty-
four hours a day are safe streets. Streets that have pedestrian and vehicular traffic, which have small 
shops and cafes open late at night, and which have residents living in apartments overlooking the 
street level are safe streets. Because they have multiple purposes, such streets have eyes. People must 
have some reason for using the sidewalks; otherwise they stay indoors (Jeffery 1971). She supported 
dense, mixed-use neighbourhoods as found i n traditional American cities. Its versatile traffic flow 
provides a social and politic correlation, which contributes to the construction of an interconnected 
neighbourhood; a neighbourhood that is self-regulating, regulated by a web of informal agreements 
(Jacobs 1961). 
  




If people are afraid, they remain inside behind locked doors, and such withdrawal increases the 
isolation of the streets and thus increases the crime rate. A vicious cycle is created whereby crime 
forces people to stay off the streets and out of the parks, and non-use of streets and parks results in a 
further increase in crime. In an era when urban renewal meant razing neighbourhoods to build high-
rises, she argued for cities on a human scale, for foot traffic, for safe streets protected not by heavy 
police presence but by the "eyes of the city":  neighbours keeping an eye on one another. 
 
 
2.2      Defensible Space theory 
 
2.2.1  Oscar Newman 
Oscar Newman, architect and city planner known for his work in crime prevention, has developed the 
theory of Defensible Space, which helps neighbourhoods redesign physically for greater safety. 
Newman’s target was similar to Jacob’s but the intervening years had enabled him to research some of 
the problems of housing design and crime. He convinced many that the form of modern buildings 
might have something to do with the increase in crime (Poyner 1983). 
The concept of Defensible Space evolved some 30 years ago, when he witnessed the decline of the 
newly constructed Pruitt-Igoe public housing high-rise project in St. Louis, U.S.A. Its design followed 
the planning principles of Le Corbusier and the C.I.A.M.-movement (see figure 2.1), and was hailed as 
an example of the new enlightenment.  Residents were raised into the air in 11-story buildings to keep 
the grounds and the first floor free for community activities. The buildings had communal corridors 
on every third floor to house laundry, storage, garbage, and communal rooms (Newman 1996). This 
new phenomenon brought many 
unanticipated problems. They are 
particularly vulnerable to high rates of 
crime. The physical characteristics of large 
developments allow criminals to use 
undifferentiated space and spaces with 
low visibility to attack victims. A majority 
of residential burglaries occur in areas of 
low-income or poverty-ridden areas, and 
low socio-economic status and weak 
family-ties are strong indicators of crime.           
Figure 2.1 Overall view of Pruitt-Igoe, a public housing project  
constructed in St. Louis in the 1960s (source: Newman 1996) 
 
The physical  factors that correlate most strongly with crime rates are, in order of importance: the 
height of the buildings, which in turn correlates highly with the number of apartments sharing the 
entry to a building; the size of the housing project; and the number of other publicly assisted housing 
projects in the area. The overwhelming sizes of the projects are not to human scale and are difficult for 
residents and communities to feel a sense of ownership over (Newman 1996).   
  




According to Newman (1996), defensible space creates "the physical appearance of a social fabric that 
defends itself". It is a sense of ownership, an act of drawing boundaries, and outlining or delineating 
acceptable behaviour within the public and private intersections.  Through community and personal 
action, people can begin to identify their space and how it is defensible.    
Concern over high crime rates in communities and neighbourhoods has made the theory of Defensible 
Space more interesting. It operates by subdividing large portions of public spaces and assigning them 
to individuals and small groups to use and control as their own private areas. It does not 
automatically oust the criminal; it just renders the criminal ineffective (Newman 1996). Reducing 
crime for the safety of the community and its residents is difficult. Criminologists have developed 
various theories of crime, and different management strategies have been tried over the past few 
decades to decrease this pervasive problem. One method of crime prevention that is becoming more 
prevalent as a tool in combination with other abatement strategies is Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) (Newman 1972).  
CPTED blends three main strategy areas to decrease crime to first deter criminal activity and then to 
promote access and legibility for enforcement. All of these methods are applicable to public housing 
projects (Poyner 1983).   
 
CPTED strategies are organized into three categories:  
 
1. Access control 
Access control’s main aim is to decrease crime opportunity by denying access to a target and 
increasing perception of risk by offenders.   
 
2. Surveillance 
Surveillance strategies include increasing police patrol, improving lighting inside building lobbies, 
stairwells, fire exits, hallways and other public and semi-public areas and natural surveillance 
techniques like increasing the size and number of windows in units and facing units onto the street 
and other public areas, close to the ground to increase “eyes on the street” (Jacobs 1961).    
 
3. Territorial enforcement  
Territoriality as a strategy refers to the creation or expansion of the sphere of influence an individual 
or a community has over physical space. This is a fundamental notion in environmental psychology, 
and is the foundation for Newman’s Defensible Space theory (Newman 1972).  
 
Examples of using territoriality to secure space usually means dividing and reassigning public space 
to communities to maintain, personalize and use (see figure 2.2). This increases the perception of risk 













Figure 2.2 Before and after photographs of an area where the concept of Defensible Space has been implemented. 
The original layout provided no grounds in the front of units for individual residents. In the site redesign, the 
central green area, which was largely neglected, was removed and residents were given their own front yards, 
which they quickly improved (source: Newman 1996). 
 
The National Crime Prevention Council (2002) defines crime prevention as "the anticipation, 
recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of action to remove or reduce it." To 
contribute to this end, planners and designers must understand where they can have an impact. 
Newman  (1972) has long known that three elements must be present for a crime to occur: desire, 
ability, and opportunity. Assuming that the criminal behaves in a rational way, he or she must have 
both a desire and the ability to carry out a crime; and, favourable opportunities must be present to 
facilitate the criminal's desire and ability. Planners and designers have a direct role in affecting this 
integral part of the crime triangle. They have the know-how and influence to alter the physical 
environment in ways that reduce or prevent opportunities for terrorist attacks to occur. 
Environmental design in conjunction with the theory of Defensible Space uses a different method to 
controlling criminal behaviour and public safety than previous systems. Instead of approaching crime 
by looking for and correcting its root causes, environmental design attempts to eliminate or reduce the 
opportunity of a criminal to commit an offence, or denies access to crime targets by modifying 
physical space. While the relationship between the design of the built environment and human 
behaviour is complex, and the direction of causality is sometimes unclear, concepts from this 
discipline can be applied to create safer and less fearful places (Newman 1996). 
 
2.2.2  Criticism on the Defensible Space theory 
Critics of the Defensible Space theory argue that causal links between defensible space modifications 
and reductions in crime has never been demonstrated. According to Wekerle & Whitzman (1995), 
‘design never operates independently of wider social and management factors’. Newman focused on 
public housing environments. His emphasis on creating a sense of territoriality and controlling access 
to strangers by cutting up common space or privatizing it, cannot be applied to urban public spaces 
that must be accessible to large numbers of people. CPTED initiatives also does not deal with fear of 
crime and the substantial variations of fear of crime found among different groups. It focuses 
primarily on reducing property crimes; there is no acknowledgement that violent crime prevention in 
urban public space may require different measures (Wekerle & Whitzman 1995).  
  




Also, another way of reasoning has been made by Taylor (2002). He argues that extensive work in 
interior and exterior spaces highlights how different groups of people use the same space, or 
physically similar spaces, in different ways. In the case of crime specifically, social, cultural, and 
economic factors almost always have far stronger impacts on how much crime is taking place in a 
environment, than design features. So, he says, if the theory of Defensible Space is assuming that 
design is the pre-eminent influence on the outcomes of interest, and therefore certain design changes 
are both a necessary and sufficient condition for prevention, it is incorrect. Empirical work has shown 
that design does not have the strongest connection with crime, when compared to social, cultural, or 
economic factors. Design-crime connections are conditioned by context and highly malleable. In the 
case of Defensible Space, undefended defensible spaces have been noted (Taylor 2002).      
Newman argued that anonymous and large physical environments asked for insecurity, mostly 
because these environments should implicate a lack of social functioning. Like Jacobs, who argued for 
an architectural development with as much ‘eyes on the street’ as possible, he suggested that a bigger 
blend of ground exploitation, with a lot of different functions, shall lead to more social functioning 
and because of that less insecurity and feelings of insecurity.  
The first thought (increased social functioning would lead to a decrease in insecurity) is worthwile to 
strive for, but that does not mean that is works like that. It does not require a lot of empathy to think 
about downtowns and their crime rates. It may be accepted that, unless reasonably good social 
functioning, downtowns are still the stage for acts of crime. However, his second thought (increased 
social functioning would lead to a decrease in feelings of insecurity) is really worth considering. Only 
decreasing feeling of insecurity is already a good reason for implementing concepts of Defensible 
Space. This is the difference between objective and subjective safety. 
Awareness of the disadvantages may help to be more critical to the theory, but the disadvantages do 
not reject the theory as a whole. Knowing and understanding all of the critics, this study still uses the 
theory of Defensible Space, because the essence of it, ‘creating a climate of safety by designing a 
physical environment’, is what counts for terrorist attack protection measures as well, which we will 
see in the following paragraph.  
 
 
2.3  Crime versus terrorism  
Defensible Space and CPTED are planning processes, as compared to fortressing or target hardening 
(Atlas 1999). The emphasis is on structuring the physical layout of space so that its residents are able 
to establish a sense of ownership and control over common areas in the community. Both of these 
proactive approaches to crime prevention have merit; designers should carefully evaluate the unique 
requirements of each design problem to identify the most appropriate strategy. 
They are crime reduction techniques that have several key elements applicable to the analysis of 
building function and site design against physical attack. It is used by architects, city planners, and 
landscape designers with the objective of creating a climate of safety by designing a physical 
environment that positively influences human behaviour. It is justified to use the theory of Defensible 
Space (and CPTED), because it is often entwined with terrorist attack protection measures. Many 
antiterrorist design approaches are similar to those found in CPTED (Atlas 1999). 
  




Terrorism brings along a real threat for almost every country and its inhabitants. The terrorist acts are 
of a totally different kind than they used to be. Nowadays people have the availability of knowledge 
and materials to commit a terrorist attack. Knowledge about bombs has grown to such a degree that 
almost any terrorist or criminal can find out the information to build a bomb to carry out their acts.  
Yet, with all of the catastrophic effects of terrorism in the past and the huge potential for damage in 
the future, acts of terrorism are relatively infrequent (Atlas 1999). The damage it brings is less than 
loss of life and property from crime. Designing against the threats and vulnerabilities of crime and 
terrorism is necessary and useful. In designing against terrorism or crime, the threats and 
vulnerabilities need to be assessed. The first step is to evaluate the assets that are to be protected. 
Usually the assets of our buildings are PIP, which stands for People, Information and Property. The 
threats are the potential for losses of the assets. The vulnerabilities are the weaknesses, shortcomings, 
or perception of risk of attack by the actuality of crime or terrorism (Atlas 1999).  
 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) can make a difference in preventing acts 
of terrorism. It emphasizes problem seeking before rushing into problem solving and starts with the 
threat and vulnerability analysis to determine the weakness and potential for attack. Attack from 
criminal behaviour or attack from terrorist activity only reflect a change in the level and types of 
threats. The process and challenges are the same (Atlas 1999).  
However, there is still a little difference between protecting against terrorism at one side and crime at 
the other side. The chance of being a victim from terrorism is not so big, while the potential for loss is 
very large. The protection measures against terrorism are of a different kind than the ones of normal 
crime prevention. Terrorists are not ‘normal’ criminals: their goals, their willingness to sacrifice 
innocent lives, and their willingness to die in their attacks make them extraordinary criminals, against 
whom extraordinary measures must be taken if security is to be achieved and maintained (Combs 
1997). The probability for being a victim of crime is quite high, yet the individual loss may be 
perceived as small. Yet, the collective loss from crime is big on the costs to society. Protecting people, 
information, and property is a high priority for all buildings and/or sites, and designing for crime may 
reduce the opportunity for acts of terrorism.  
  
The question is to what extent the theory of Defensible Space can be applied to the measures taken to 
protect cities, neighbourhoods, sites or buildings against terrorist attacks, the topic of this research. 
The basic assumption is that Oscar Newman has developed his concepts for the prevention of crime. 
Crime prevention is about reducing or preventing the opportunity for a criminal to commit a crime, 
by altering the physical environment. And that is exactly the same as what planners and designers 
mean with terrorist attack protection measures, they want to reduce the opportunity for terrorists to 
attack a certain buildings or other urban structure, by preventing them for coming too close to that 
certain building and/or site. They want an environment that is safe and pleasant for citizens to live in, 
and at the same time, to the utmost protected against terrorist attacks. Finding a balance between this 














3  Terrorist attack protection measures 
 
After having described the theories of a physical environment defending itself against terrorist attacks 
in the previous chapter, the principles of different security measures and the terrorist attack protection 
measures will be described in this chapter. Attended will be which physical protection measures can 
be used in the protection against terrorist attacks and how they are being implemented in the regular 
security task. But, before these protection measures will be outlined, first will be explained how 
nations and individuals assess the potential threat of terrorism. Namely, before terrorist attack 
protection measures are being and can be implemented, one has to assess a certain threat. That is the 
motive for ultimately implementing protection measures.  
 
 
3.1  The assessment of terrorist threats 
How do nations or individuals decide which of their operations or activities are likely to be victims of 
terrorist attacks? Three types of indicators are being used to assess the potential threat of terrorism. 
These can be described as general threat indicators, local threat indicators, and specific threat 
indicators (Combs 1997). This threat assessment will provide a facility designer the design criteria for 
threat against a facility. They will know how high the threat is, and what and in which way needs to 
be protected.  
 
3.1.1  General threat indicators 
General threat indicators are used do determine whether, within the nation or state, conditions exist 
which might stimulate or  provoke terrorism. Such indicators are extremely general, and are 
consequently of little use in predicting the likelihood of a specific terrorist attack.  
Instead, they are used to assess the climate (political, ideological, religious, etc.), which might 
influence the willingness of a portion of the population to resort to terrorism (Combs 1997). Politically, 
for example, the presence of an unpopular, repressive, or corrupt government is considered a positive 
indicator of the probability of terrorism. Similarly, an economic climate, which includes extreme 
poverty and high unemployment, is regarded as conductive to terrorism.  
This does not mean that any nation or region possessing these political or economic conditions will 
necessarily have a large degree of terrorism. It simply means that the presence of such conditions 
makes the likelihood of terrorism greater in such places than it might be in areas that do not have 
similar political or economic climates. These are indicators only, not predictors of terrorism. 
 
3.1.2  Local threat indicators 
Local threat indicators are used to assess more specific and localized possibilities for terrorism. 
Usually, such indicators focus on the ‘deviations’ on the local level, and the degree of violence 
involved in the expression of this ‘deviation’ (Combs 1997). The formation of radical groups; reports 
of stolen ammunition and explosives; violence against local property or against individuals; and the 
discovery of weapon, ammunition, and explosive caches are all considered to be local threat 
indicators. Again, this does not mean that any radical group must necessarily be a terrorist threat or  
  




that any demonstration against a government or a company must be the lead up to a terrorist attack. 
These are just some indicators of the possibility of terrorism in a particular location. 
 
3.1.3  Specific threat indicators 
Specific threat indicators are used to evaluate the vulnerability of a particular target to terrorism, not 
the likelihood of terrorism in a nation or neighbourhood. These indicators include such things as the 
history of attacks on similar targets, the publicity value of the target, the target’s access to infiltration, 
its counter-terror capability, its communications capability, the tactical attractiveness of the target, and 
the availability of the police or other security personnel. 
 
None of the three types of indicators can be said to ‘predict’ the probability of a terrorist attack. 
Nevertheless, government and industry are beginning to rely increasingly on such indicators to help 




3.2  Types of security 
After the just mentioned terrorist threat assessment the potential targets are being selected and in this 
way become a target of security. Creating an effective security system, which protects against a wide 
range of terrorist attacks is a difficult task.  Implementing security can be done with at least two 
aspects to the situation: operational security and physical security; the object of this research. 
 
3.2.1  Operational security 
Operational security has as its objective: ‘the denial of opportunity for terrorists to collect information 
on either the facility or its activities that might enable them to predict those activities’ (Combs 1997).  
To be able to predict those activities would help the terrorists to successfully penetrate the facility or 
activity to disrupt or destroy it. By denying that information to terrorists, the risk for terrorists 
carrying out an attack against the activity or facility significantly increases.  
Prediction of operational activities usually relies on behavioural patterns, so operational security 
analysis focuses on identifying those patterns and how they are communicated to personnel. 
Emphasis is placed on making such patterns less predictable, randomizing activities as far as possible 
without creating chaos within the organization (Combs 1997). Too often, repeated activities create in 
the minds of the individuals responsible for security numbness, a lack of alertness to small differences 
that may be crucial. The arrival of a particular car at the same time every morning can deaden the 
alertness of personnel to such factors as the identity of the driver as the presence of an authorized 
person in the vehicle. It requires human intervention. Examples of operational security measures are: 
guards, sensors, closed-circuit television, and other electronic devices (Conrath 1999). 
 
3.2.2  Physical security 
Physical security has as its objective: ‘the hardening o f the target against which an attack may be 
made’ (Combs 1997).  It is strongly dependent upon operational security. Fortress walls, fences, and  
  




gates are not, in modern times, either reasonable or sufficient protection against determined terrorists. 
The operation of the facility itself must be secure, and its personnel well trained in security 
procedures, in order to be properly protected against terrorist attacks. Also called passive security, it 
does not require human intervention. Examples of physical security are: barriers, bollards, planters, 
and structural hardening (Conrath 1999). 
 
To have a balanced design, both types of measures need to be implemented into the overall security of 
a facility. One should remember that any security system is only as strong as its weakest link (Conrath 
1999). Architects and engineers can contribute to an effective physical security system which not only 
augment the operational security functions, but also simplifies them. For instance, by providing a 
design that accommodates the inspection of pedestrians and vehicular traffic.  Because of the 
interrelationship between physical and operational security measures, it is imperative for the owner 
and security professional to define early in the design process what extent of operational security is 
planned for various threat levels.  
 
 
3.3  The implementation of physical security measures 
An effective way to implement security is to create 
different layers. Difference can be made between 
the perimeter line of the facility, the approach zone 
to the facility, the building exterior, and the 
building interior (see figure 3.1).  The result of all of 
these different layers is “designated security 
zones” (Dixon 2003). These zones, which normally 
include buildings and public spaces adjacent to 
potential targets, such as the blocks immediately 
surrounding courthouses, require increased 
investment to harden buildings or undertake other 
measures to limit damage and loss of life that 
might result from an attack on a nearby target.  
 
Figure 3.1 The different layers of security 
(source: Federal Emergency Management Agency 2003a) 
 
3.3.1  Perimeter line 
It is the outermost line that can be protected by the security measures provided by the facility. In 
design, it is assumed that all large-scale explosive weapons are outside this line of defence. This line 
should be defended by both physical and operational security methods. It is recommended that the 
perimeter line is located as far as is practical form the building exterior (Conrath 1999). This is an 
effective way to limit the damage to buildings. If the distance from the building to the explosive 
source can be doubled, the overpressure is reduced by roughly a factor of eight.  




3.3.2  Approach zone 
The approach zone refers to controlled access to the facility through the perimeter line. Architects and 
engineers can accommodate security functions by providing adequate design for these activities, 
which makes it difficult for a vehicle to crash onto the site. This may be done through the use of 
barrier walls and other devices.  The most visible response to “9/11” for most people has been the 
introduction of airport-like security measures at entrances to city halls, major office buildings, and 
other important buildings and spaces. Perhaps less obvious has been the closing of many entry points 
to create single points of entry and exit that can be monitored efficiently. A quick increase in the 
number of buildings that limit entry points and monitor all the people who enter, has been the most 
visible change in access control since “9/11”. 
 
3.3.3  Building exterior 
At the building exterior the focus shifts from delaying the intruder to mitigating the effects of an 
explosion. The exterior envelope of the building is the most vulnerable to an exterior explosive threat 
because it is the part of the building that is closest to the weapon. It is also a critical line of defence for 
protecting the occupants of the building. 
 
3.3.4  Building interior 
Building interior can be divided into two categories: the functional layout and the structural layout. 
As for functional layouts, public areas such as the lobby need to be separated from the more secured 
areas of the facility. The impact on a building’s structural integrity that would result from detonation 
of a weapon in the public areas, and spaces next to the exterior walls and on the lower floors need to 
be examined by designers (Conrath 1999). One way of protecting the occupant is to place stairwells or 
corridors beside the exterior walls instead of office spaces, thus providing a buffer zone. 
 
This study focuses on the physical security 
measures, and in particular the first three 
layers of security: the perimeter line, the 
approach zone, and the building exterior. 
Those three layers together form this study 
its unit of analysis (see figure 3.2). They have 
a direct impact on the city its façade. Those 
security measures can be seen from the 
streets and can influence the way people see 
or use the city and its streets. 
 








3.4  Examples of physical security 
 
3.4.1  The objective of measures 
The objective of physical security measures is not to create a bunker or a bombproof building, which 
would be impractical for commercial structures, but instead to find practical, cost-effective measures 
to mitigate the effects of an explosive attack (Conrath 1999). The objective is to make the potential 
terrorist act so difficult that the amateur is defeated and the professional finds the cost too high. The 
physical security measures are ‘hardening the target’, which involves efforts to make targets less 
accessible, and by this means create conditions under which it would be impossible for terrorists to 
successfully attack critical targets (Kupperman & Trent 1979). Hardening the target is synonymous 
with establishing barriers. The goal of the designer is to reduce the risk of catastrophic structural 
collapse, thus saving lives and facilitating evacuation and rescue efforts. If properly implemented, 
physical security measures will contribute toward the following three goals (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 2003a): 
 
1. Preventing an attack 
By making it more difficult to implement some of  the more obvious attack scenarios (such as a parked 
car in the street) or making the target appear to be of low value in terms of the amount of sensation 
that would be generated if it were attacked, the would-be attacker may become discouraged from  
targeting the building. 
 
2. Delaying the attack 
If an attack is initiated, properly designed landscape or architectural features can delay its execution 
by making it more difficult for the  attacker to reach the intended target. This will give the security 
forces and authorities time to mobilize and possibly to stop the attack before it is executed.  
 
3. Mitigating the effects of the attack 
If these precautions are implemented and the attack still takes place, then structural protection efforts 
will serve to control the extent and consequences of damage. In the context of the overall security 
provided to the building, structural protection is a last resort that only becomes effective after all other 
efforts to stop the attack have failed. In the event of an attack, the benefits of improvement to life-
safety systems may be realized in lives saved. 
 
3.4.2  The appearance of measures 
The implementation of fences and barriers against terrorists is a fairly standard practice at buildings 
or sites that are likely targets for terrorist attacks. Protection against a determined, well-equipped 
terrorist group must be strong and sophisticated. The chain-link galvanized steel fence, sometimes 
topped with a few stands of barbed wire, is probably the most common perimeters barrier. When 
backed up by a guard force it is quite effective against casual and even determined intruders unless 
they are well equipped. A well-maintained chain-link perimeter fence is the first priority in defence 
against saboteurs (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2003b).  
 
  




Most of the physical protection measures are fixed in place and do not allow for vehicle entry. These 
are to be used away from vehicle access points. The majority of these are constructed in place. For 
lower-risk buildings without straight-on vehicular access, these are appropriate enough. Examples of 
these barriers are planters, lighters, trash cans, bollards, benches, and bus shelters (see figure 3.3). 
Also, using landscaping features can deter an intrusion threat. An example of a simple but effective 
landscaping solution is to install a deep permanent planter around the building with a wall that is as 









Figure 3.3 Examples of physical security 





Individual planters placed on sidewalks resist impact through inactivity between the planter and the 
pavement. It can be expected that the planter will move as a result of the impact. To reduce 
displacement, the planter may be placed several inches below the pavement surface.  
The traditional anti-ram solution entails the use of bollards. Bollards are concrete-filled steel pipes that 
are placed every few feet along a sidewalk to prevent vehicle intrusion. In order for them to resist the 
impact of a vehicle the height of the bollard above ground should be higher than the bumper of the 
vehicle. An alternative to a bollard is a plinth wall, which is a wall  constructed of reinforced concrete 
with a buried foundation. The wall may be fashioned into a bench, a base for a fence, or the wall of a 
planter. To be effective, the height needs to be at least as high as the vehicle bumper (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency 2003b).   
 
The discussed examples are largely applicable to any type of civilian building serving large numbers 
of people on a daily basis. The uniqueness of occupancy types from the perspective of protective 
design is a function of many factors, including hours of peak usage, dominant population, size of 
building, and construction type (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2003b). Detailed analysis of 
the vulnerability of important buildings or sites indicates that erection of barriers can be vital in 
preventing terrorists from planning or executing an attack. Obviously, barriers are of reduced value if 
the target routinely permits visitors to tour and note vulnerable parts of the facility.  
  




3.5  Disadvantages of terrorist attack protection measures 
In responding to the threat of terrorism, a loose network of public officials, architects, developers, 
engineers, lawyers, planners, security consultants, and others who influence building codes are 
creating a new generation of planning and design regulations, with making terrorism more difficult 
and reducing its human and material toll as their purpose. Unfortunately, the broader, indirect impact 
of these regulations, with their focus on isolating people from buildings and shutting buildings off 
from streets, could undermine the vitality, sense of community, and civic quality of cities (Dixon 
2003). In fact, the economic, social, and design dimensions of urban communities have been largely 
ignored in most of the approaches to fighting terrorism that have emerged since “9/11”. Many 
practitioners have become deeply concerned about security following the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing, and brought to the discussion a heightened commitment to enhancing security but very 
little focus on the impact their recommendation could have on larger issues of urban development. 
The security measures discussed here threaten to provide cities with civic structures hidden behind 
blank, blast-resistant walls; important public buildings quarantined inside vehicle free zones; and city 
streets rendered more dangerous by the elimination of the windows and doorways that promote 
interaction between people in the buildings and on the streets (Dixon 2003).  
 
No matter how attractively designed a 100-foot setback free of vehicles and pedestrians are, they are a 
serious threat to pedestrian oriented downtowns. Civic values are at stake as new regulations to fight 
terrorism are considered. Architects designing embassies and o ther federal buildings have long 
wrestled with the apparent contradictions between an open and free society (Kupperman & Trent 
1979) and the bunker-like architectural qualities that meet security concerns.  
Architects and urban planners will be challenged to create buildings and cities that do not look like 
bunkers or fortresses, despite their reliance on obvious security measures. This concern extends to a 
broad range of values that shape the civic quality of our cities. For example, creating barriers around 
historic buildings alters their character and diminishes a sense of connection to both historic values 




















   




4  Methodology case studies  
 
Case studies have been executed by doing a photographic research in three different cities in the 
U.S.A. and in The Netherlands. This means that by making photographs of different physical 
protection measures at different locations, there has been tried to portray the actual implementation of 
the measures and how they interfere with the building or site and the users of that building or site.  
During the analysis of the cases, a methodology examines four different components for each of the 
photograph collages of the different case studies. The methodology exists out of the following four 
different components: 
 
1.  Protected object 
A description of the protected object will teach us the kind of building we have to deal with, the 
function it possesses, and/ or if it has any symbolic value. 
 
2.  Type and design of protection measure 
The type and design of the actual physical protection measure is important to know, because not all 
the protection measures have the same volume and/ or size,  and that is important for the overall 
appearance of the implemented protection measure. Also, its design contributes for a great deal to its 
appearance and from that, the feeling it gives.  
 
3.  Is it temporary or long lasting? 
Often, one can see that some protection measures are temporary, and other ones are everlasting. To a 
great extent this can be recognized by the way they look and the way they are integrated in the overall 
design of the building or the layout of the site. There is not one determined way to ascertain if it is a 
temporary or everlasting measure, other than ask officers responsible for implementation or property 
owners, but that was not realizable. Still, it is interesting to know if it is temporary or everlasting, 
because the fact if it is a temporary or everlasting protection measure, could be held accountable for 
the time and money people have spend to implement and design it, and this could have an influence 
on the effect for users of affected areas. So, from the way the protection measure is designed and the 
way it fits in the bigger whole, is derived if it is temporary or everlasting.  
 
4.  Effect of protection measure for users of affected areas 
What is the influence of the physical protection measures for the users of affected areas? Does using 
physical protection measures to protect a building and/ or site constrain the ability to move around? 
Does it hinder car drivers, cyclists or pedestrians?  
 
Symbolic value is not the same for everybody. Appearance of the protection measure and the feeling it 
gives is also subjective, and also the effect of the protection measure for users does not necessarily 
have to be the same for everybody. To get a little more objective in terms of these components, after 
each different case study a table with valuations of eight different analyzed variables will be given.  
 
  




In one glance can be seen what the values are of the variables for each different case study. A table 
with the values of the variables in all the case studies can be found in the appendix (H). The different 
variables and the values can be seen in figure 4.1.  
 
Variables    Values 
 1. Symbolic value of protected object       + : yes 
 2. Economic value of protected object       0 : neutral 
 3. Attention for design of protection measure       - : no 
 4. Protection measure in harmony with     
     surrounding     
 5. Effect for pedestrians     
 6. Effect for vehicles     
 7. Create feelings of insecurity     
 8. Effect for urban design     
Figure 4.1 Explanation of variables and values     
 
After each case study a table will show the values for the above mentioned variables. 
 
Also, by doing interviews or conversations with responsible officers of the municipalities, more 
interesting and valuable information has been acquired. These ‘officials in the field’ provided 























5  Case studies in the U.S.A. 
 
This chapter will analyze three different case studies in the U.S.A. Examined will be physical 
protection measures in Chicago, New York City and Washington D.C., by using an in advance drawn 
methodology. Because of logistic research restrictions, only in Chicago, IL, a more extensive and in-
depth case study has been executed. Nevertheless, the information collected by executing the other 
two case studies provides the study with extra valuable information and will help to better draw 
conclusions and to give recommendations at the end of this research.  
For the case of Chicago extra valuable information has been acquired by interviewing architect Mr. 
Albert H. Mark (City of Chicago Public Building Commission) and architect Mr. Thomas W. Vukovich 
(City of Chicago Department of General Services). A report of this interview can be found in appendix 
C. Also, a survey on the streets at a specific site in downtown Chicago has been accomplished. This 
survey (recorded as appendix A) has tried to collect information on a personal level from the users of 
that site. In New York City extra information has been acquired by having two different informal 
conversations with architect Mr. Richard F. Ramsey from Rogers Marvel Architects and urban planner 
Mr. Frank Uffen from New Amsterdam Development Consultants. There are no reports of these 
conversations, because they were on an informal basis. They just provided information and their ideas 
by either showing a presentation or showing the best sites to go to and take photographs. For the case 
of Washington D.C. data has been obtained by taking photographs only. Time constraints made it not 
feasible to speak with officials or professionals here. 
 
Before the results of the three case studies will be shown, first some background information on 
terrorist protection in the U.S.A. will be given, by outlining the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, both responsible for terrorism prevention and 
protection in the U.S.A. 
 
5.1  Homeland Security 
After “9/11”, the American view developed that threat assessment and risk-management should 
improve and grow with a full range of standing measures, in order to remove as many vulnerabilities 
as possible (Stevenson 2004). Responsible for this comprehensive approach is the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), 
which prescribes warnings at 
five different threat-condition 
levels corresponding to colours: 
low (green), guarded (blue), 
elevated (yellow), high (orange) 
and severe (red). Each level 
activates an incrementally more 
severe set of protection 
measures.                     Figure 5.1 Vision and mission of the DHS (source: U.S. Department 
                                                              of Homeland Security 2005)   
 
Department of Homeland Security  
 
Vision: “Preserving our freedoms, protecting America… we secure 
our homeland”. 
 
Mission: “We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. 
We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and 
respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and 
secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote 
the free-flow of commerce”.   




The criteria for issuing the warning include the credibility of threat information; its degree of 
corroboration; specificity and imminence of the threat; and gravity of potential consequences 
(Stevenson 2004). The DHS serves to mobilize and organize the U.S.A. to secure its homeland from 
terrorist attacks.  
One primary reason for the establishment of the DHS was to provide the unifying centre for the vast 
national network of organizations and institutions involved in efforts to secure the U.S.A. (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 2005). In order to do this, the department developed its own high-
level strategic plan. The vision and mission statements (see figure 5.1), strategic goals and objectives 
provide the framework guiding the actions that make up its daily operations. In the event of a terrorist 
attack, natural disaster or other large-scale emergency, the DHS will assume primary responsibility for  
ensuring that emergency response professionals are prepared for any situation. This will entail 
providing a coordinated, comprehensive federal response to any large-scale crisis and mounting a fast 
and effective recovery effort.   
More than 87.000 different governmental jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local level have 
homeland security responsibilities. The comprehensive national strategy seeks to develop a 
complementary system connecting all levels of government without duplicating effort (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 2005). Among the major components that make up the DHS is the 
Federal E mergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). 
It ensures that the U.S.A. is 
prepared for incidents, whether 
natural disasters or terrorist 
attacks, and oversees the federal 
government’s national response 
and recovery strategy. It is 
tasked with responding to, 
planning for, recovering from 
and mitigating against disasters 
(U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 2005).        Figure 5.2 Vision and goals of the FEMA (source: U.S. Federal 
                                                              Emergency Management Agency 2005) 
 
In 2001, the terrorist attacks of “9/11” focused the agency on issues of national preparedness and 
homeland security. The agency coordinated its activities with the just formed Office of Homeland 
Security, and FEMA's Office of National Preparedness was given responsibility for helping to ensure 
that the nation's first responders were trained and equipped to deal with weapons of mass destruction 
(U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 2005). Billions of dollars of new funding were directed 
to FEMA to help communities face the threat of terrorism. In March 2003, FEMA joined 22 other 
federal agencies, programs and offices in becoming the Department of Homeland Security. The new 
department brought a coordinated approach to national security from emergencies and disasters, both 
natural and man-made. FEMA's mission remains: “to lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to and 
recover from disasters with a vision of ‘A Nation Prepared" (see figure 5.2). Today, FEMA is one of four  
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
Vision: “A Nation Prepared” 
 
Goals: 
1.  Reduce loss of life and property. 
2.  Minimize suffering and disruption caused by disasters. 
3.  Prepare the Nation to address the consequences of terrorism. 
4.  Serve as the Nation’s portal for emergency management    
  information and expertise. 
5.  Create a motivating and challenging environment for employees. 
6.  Make FEMA a world-class enterprise.  




major branches of DHS (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 2005). By implementing 
physical protection measures, they try to reach their first goal, ‘reduce loss of life and property.’  The 
implementation of these measures for federal buildings (including monuments in Washington D.C.) is 
the responsibility from the DHS and the FEMA. Securing other, non-federal buildings is not among 
the tasks of the DHS or the FEMA, but is the responsibility from the property or site owner itself.  The 
DHS or the FEMA cannot oblige private owners to implement these measure, but they do only highly 
recommend it.  
 
  




5.2  Case study Chicago, IL  
Chicago, Illinois, is the biggest and most important city in the Midwest of the U.S.A. With 2.8 million 
inhabitants in Chicago itself, and 8.5 million inhabitants in the metropolitan area, it is the third biggest 
city of the U.S.A. (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia 2005). This case study comprises the financial 
district of Chicago, which is known as the Loop (see figure 5.3), because of the encircling by the 
elevated train ‘The Loop’. In this area of Chicago, a lot of federal buildings, bank buildings and other 
offices are situated, which are, as we have learned in this study’s theoretical framework, more likely to 
become targets of terrorist attacks, than other types 
of buildings. Most of them are protected against 
terrorist attacks by means of physical protection 
measures as can be seen on the following photograph 
collages. First, the collages will be shown, continued 
by the analysis according to the given methodology. 
For Chicago, three examples of federal buildings 
and/or sites, and one example of a private building 
will be examined. 
Figure 5.3 View from the John Hancock Centre at 
the Loop area, downtown Chicago 
 
5.2.1  Analysis of the photograph collages of Chicago 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Federal Reserve Bank, Chicago 
 
  




This first photograph collage (figure 5.4) shows the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Situated on a 
corner of an intersection of two busy streets, it has physical protection at two sides of the building (see 
5.4b and 5.4c). This bank does not have a vast national symbolic value, which makes the threat for a 
possible attack smaller, but still it is a bank, which represents a part of Chicago’s economy. 
The protection measures are big planters, interrupted by lampposts and bollards, at the front and left 
side of the building. Its design can be seen as stylish and is in good harmony with the classic design of 
the building. Altogether, the measures do not seem to be misplaced. A sidewalk, which  is not 
accessible for vehicular traffic anyway, surrounds the building only. The protection measures do not 
change the traffic situation; they only hinder cars from parking too close to the building on the 
sidewalks. The protection measures can be taken away easily, but they seem to be pretty long lasting, 
since they are in such good harmony with the rest of the building and site.  
The effect for the users of this building is minimal. They can reach the building by feet, they are not 
restricted to enter and do not have to get round the protection measures to enter the building.  
The protection measures do not certainly provoke feelings of insecurity; it is not obvious that they 
function as terrorist attack protection measures. Only the camera on the wall (see 5.4a) can indicate 
that you are entering a site or approaching a building that seems to have a heightened threat of 




Figure 5.5  Court of Justice, Chicago 
  




Figure 5.5 shows the situation at the Court of Justice. This federal building almost only has facades of 
glass (see 5.5b and 5.5c). The site and building are protected physically by marble quadrangles, 
interrupted by big elongated planters and small round ones. Again, the protection measures are in 
good harmony with each other and the site, so they do not attract a lot of attention. But, since they 
have not been put into one continuous line, and some planters have been set a little bit to the back, 
they can hinder people when they use the sidewalk; you have to get round them. All in all, it does not 
seem to be something inconvincible; there is plenty of space left to walk along the building and to use 
the site. These implemented measures are long lasting, but can be removed easily. Attention has been 
paid to the design of the measures, so they do not really provoke feelings of insecurity; they can be 
seen as liven up the site as well. The stylish, modern planters do not really affect the way the people 
enter this building or use the site. You are allowed to enter your car in the parking garage, which is 
patrolled by the security/ police (see 5.5d), so you can come close to the building by car as well. But, 
you cannot park your car around the building. Only, the little security/ police office can make you feel 
a little uncomfortable, and can make you enjoy the site less.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Daily Plaza, Chicago 
 
Chicago’s most used site in the city is Chicago Daily Plaza (see figure 5.6). The plaza lies in the middle 
of the Loop area and is the stage of Chicago’s public life. During Christmas time (the time when the 
photographs have been taken), there is a Christmas market and the city’s largest Christmas tree. It is a 
place where a lot of people meet each other, and is crowded most of the time. It is not of any national 
value, but an attack on this plaza, is an indirect attack on a lot of citizens of Chicago. The types of 
security that can be seen here are jersey barriers and metal fences (see 5.6a). It prevents vehicular 
traffic from entering the plaza and drive into the crowd. Also, there is a lot of police surveillance (see 
5.6b). The protection measures seem to be pretty temporary, because they can be removed easily, and 
it seemed that most of them were only there at that moment because of the crowded Christmas 
market. This type of protection measures, fences, jersey barriers and police, show that they are, and 
look, temporary. They are not in harmony with the site as a whole and it looks like they are placed 
haphazardly. This can make people think more that they are at a place where the threat is of such a 
nature, that these extra security measures are needed, and from that cause feelings of insecurity.    
  




5.2.2  Sears Tower site 
 
 
Figure 5.7 The Sears Tower, Chicago 
 
The Sears Tower (see figure 5.7) is the tallest building of America (1353 feet) and accommodates 
besides offices, a parking garage, a broadcast platform, a sky deck, a conference centre, a fitness 
facility and restaurants.  Day by day, thousands of people use this site and building. People work in   




this building, they come to visit, or to have lunch and use other facilities. Tourists come to see this 
architectural masterpiece and enjoy the panoramic view from the sky deck. Also, there are a lot of 
people who work in the direct surrounding of the tower and/ or use only the parking garage; they use 
the site as well. Because of the enormous amount of people who are attracted to and connected with 
the Sears Tower and its surrounding, and the symbolic value the tower has, it could be an attractive 
target for terrorists to attack. Attacking the Sears Tower causes a huge loss of people, information and 
property. That raises some questions. Do people feel unsafe when they are proximate to the Sears 
Tower? Do people feel unsafe on the streets in general because of possible terrorist attacks? To get to 
know such information, a survey among people who work in the tower, people who work and/ or live 
around the tower and people who come to visit the tower has been done (the actual survey has been 
recorded as appendix A). This difference between categories is necessary to make a distinction in the 
times people are proximate to the Sears Tower. But, because of restrictions to survey in the tower, it 
was not possible to get to know information from the category of people who work in the tower on a 
daily basis.  
 
All the results have been recorded as appendix B. In total sixty people have been surveyed, thirty 
tourists, and thirty neighbours. The difference between gender and categories is shown in table 5.8: 
 
 
      
 
 
          Table 5.8 Respondents categorized by type and gender 
 
The first question asked was: 
 
1.  “How unsafe do you feel on the streets because of possible terrorist attacks?” 
The answers to this question are showed in table 5.9: 
 
   Neighbours      Tourists         
  Male  Female      Male  Female     Total  
a. very unsafe     2  2 (7%)    1  3  4 (13%)    6 (10%) 
b. somewhat unsafe     11  11 (37%)    4  8  12 (40%)    23 (38%) 
c. not unsafe  8  9  17 (56%)    9  5  14 (47%)    31 (52%) 
  8  22      14  16      60 
       Table 5.9 How unsafe do you feel on the streets because of possible terrorist attacks? 
 
52% of all of the respondents said not to feel unsafe on the streets because of possible terrorist attacks. 
This is more than the half of the respondents, but still there is 48% who said to feel somewhat or very 
unsafe, which is a remarkable high number of people. But, since we are interested in safety 
perceptions regarding the Sears Tower, the second question was: 
 
 Neighbours   Tourists      Total     
Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
8  22  14  16  22  38 
30    30   60   




2.  “How unsafe do you feel when you are proximate to the Sears Tower?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
a. very unsafe     1  1 (3%)    6  8  14 (46%)    15 (25%) 
b. somewhat unsafe     13  13 (43%)    2  6  8 (27%)    21 (35%) 
c. not unsafe  8  8  16 (54%)    6  2  8 (27%)    24 (40%) 
  8  22      14  16      60 
       Table 5.10 How unsafe do you feel when you are proximate to the Sears Tower? 
 
A fourth part said that they felt very unsafe when they were proximate to the Sears Tower (see table 
5.10).  Of these answers, there are more tourists than neighbours who have said to feel very unsafe or 
somewhat unsafe, this explains the difference in type of respondents. People who are more familiar 
with the neighbourhood feel less unsafe than people who are not in that neighbourhood day by day 
and do not know it so well. Attachment with a neighbourhood can contribute to safety feelings 
regarding that particular neighbourhood. People who know the Loop area and the Sears Tower very 
well, are more familiar with the environment, so they do not have to be more afraid of possible attacks 
than in any other neighbourhood or city, because nothing really bad has happened here before. 
The survey continued with questions about protection measures. It is interesting to see if they have 
noticed them, and if it influences the way they see, use or think about the building and/ or site. The 
third question was: 
 
3.  “Have you noticed any protection measures at the Sears Tower since “9/11”?’’ 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
a. no  4  1  5 (17%)    7  12  19 (63%)    24 (40%) 
b. yes  4  21  25 (83%)    7  4  11 (37%)    36 (60%) 
  8  22      14  16      60 
       Table 5.11 Have you noticed any protection measures at the Sears Tower since “9/11”? 
 
36 out of the 60 respondents said that they did have noticed the protection measures at the Sears 
Tower. Only 11 out of this are tourists, so concluded can be that tourists do not know the 
neighbourhood from before “9/11”, which sounds plausible. The 36 people who did noticed the 
protection measures are important for the rest of the survey, because it is interesting to know from 
them how they regard these protection measures. Therefore, the fourth question was:  




4.  “Do you feel safer now with this protection?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
a. much safer     6  6 (24%)    1     1 (10%)    7 (19%) 
b. somewhat safer     8  8 (32%)    2  3  5 (45%)    13 (36%) 
c. not safer  4  7  11 (44%)    4  1  5 (45%)    16 (45%) 
  4  21      7  4      36 
       Table 5.12 Do you feel safer now with this protection? 
 
There is no big difference between neighbours and tourists in answering this question. 45% of the 36 
people who did say that they have noticed the protection measures, also said that they did not make 
them feel safer, only 55% said that they felt somewhat or much safer. This is more than the half, but 
still it is not much. The protection measures have been implemented to offer a heightened security 
level and to let all the people feel safe. Still, there is a big number who does not feel safer with this 
protection. Is it due to the way the protection measures look? Do the protection measures itself 
provoke feelings of insecurity? Do they strengthen their feelings of insecurity, because without the 
security measures they would not have realized that they are approaching a site or entering a building 
with a heightened threat for terrorist attacks? Or do they, because of the implementation, hinder them 
in the way they use the building and/ or site? To get to know more detailed information, the survey 
continued with: 
 
5.  “Do any of the changes at Sears Tower constrain your ability to move around?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
a. yes  2  7  9 (36%)    2  3  5 (45%)    14 (39%) 
b. no  2  14  16 (64%)    5  1  6 (55%)    22 (61%) 
  4  21      7  4      36 
       Table 5.13 Do any of the changes at Sears Tower constrain your ability to move around? 
 
The protection measures at Sears Tower do not really constrain their ability to move around, 
according to 61% of the respondents who did say that they have noticed the protection measures. 
They use and enjoy the building and/ or site in the same way as they did without the protection 
measures. Remarkable is that relatively more tourists than neighbours indicated that the protection 
measures hindered them in the way they use or enjoy the site. But, this can be explained by the fact 
that the entrance to the sky deck (tourist attraction) and the sky deck itself is a lot more protected than 
other parts of the building by means of technical security, surveillance and cameras.  
All in all can be questioned:  




6.  “Do you regard this kind of protection as positive or negative?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
a. positive  3  16  19 (76%)    6  3  9 (82%)    28 (78%) 
b. negative  1  5  6 (24%)    1  1  2 (18%)    8 (22%) 
  4  21      7  4      36 
       Table 5.14 Do you regard this kind of protection as positive or negative? 
 
Apart from feeling safer or not, or feeling constrained to move around, 78% said that they regarded 
this kind of protection as positive. It can be true that people, due to personal reasons, do not really feel 
safer with this protection, and/ or that they feel constrained to use or enjoy the building and/ or site, 
but, most of them do regard it as a positive measure to protect against terrorist attack, regardless of 
type or gender of the respondent.  
 
5.2.3  Conclusion 
After having seen the photographs and having done the survey, the conclusion can be drawn that all 
of the seen protection measures in Chicago are not of such an order that they provoke feelings of 
insecurity. They all are in good harmony with the site and/ or building they are meant to protect, and 
they do have a proper design. According to the responsible officers, architects Albert H. Mark and 
Thomas W. Vukovich (2004), it is important to make it look pleasant: “you have to find a balance between 
making people feel welcome and not making it a fortress”. That is why they want them to function well and 
do not want them to constrain citizens to move around a site or building. The survey taught us that 
78% of the people, who did say earlier that they have noticed the protection measures, regard the 
measures as positive. “They understand the necessity of the situation. It is a mind-set they have established; 
the need to feel safe”(Mark and Vukovich 2004). Only 39% said that they felt constrained in moving 
around the site.  
The physical security measures seem to be in good harmony with the affected buildings in Chicago. 
Chicago would not so quickly become a fortress, according to Mark and Vukovich (2004). “But, you 
have to take aesthetics into account when anti-terrorism measures are being implemented. An architect has to 
stress the importance of the form as well as the function”. 
 
The following table shows the valuations, in terms of yes (+), neutral (0), or no (-), of the variables 
analysed in the different examples of Chicago: 
 
  
Symbolic  Economic  Design of pro-  Harmony with  Effect for  Effect for  Create feelings  Effect for  
  
value  value  tection measure  surrounding  pedestrians  vehicles  of insecurity  urban design 
 Figure 5.4  +  +  +  +  -  -  0  + 
 Figure 5.5  +  -  +  +   +      -  0  + 
 Figure 5.6  +  -  -  -  -  +  +  + 
 Figure 5.7  +  +  +  +  -  -  0  0 
Table 5.15 Valuation table variables case studies Chicago, IL          




5.3  Case study New York City  
New York City is, with its 7,3 million inhabitants, the biggest city in the U.S.A. The case study here 
covers Manhattan, a large area filled with other smaller neighbourhoods. M anhattan is the main 
financial and business district of New York and has the most shops and tourist attractions of the city. 
Also, it is the area were the world famous attacks of “9/11” took place. This site, formerly known as 
the World Trade Centre site,  is now known as 
‘ground zero’ and still gets rebuild at the 
moment (see figure 5.16). Most of the protected 
buildings in Manhattan are in the financial 
district called Wall Street, and a smaller business 
district along the Hudson River called Battery 
Park. Also, some other bank buildings at other 
places in the city and the broadcast building of 
the CNN are protected by physical protection 
measures, and to a lesser extent federal buildings 
as well. 
Figure 5.16 Ground zero, New York City 
 
5.3.1  Analysis of the photograph collages of New York City 
 Figure 5.17 Wall Street, New York City 
 
  




The protected object as shown on figure 5.17 is a whole area, called Wall Street. Including the New 
York Stock Exchange, it is the heart of the economy of the U.S.A. Besides the economic value it has, it 
also has a major symbolic value. Attacking any building on Wall Street can be seen as a direct attack 
on capitalism, for which the U.S.A. is known. The type and design of the protection measures here are 
of a serious kind (see 5.17c, d and e) and are not meant to look nice, stylish and friendly at all. At least 
they have placed black coloured fences (see 4.18c), instead of just metal coloured ones. At only one of 
the entrances of Wall Street they have placed futuristic cubistic objects on which people can sit as well 
(see figure 5.17b). But, it is still obvious that they function as a safety measure, and they are not in 
harmony with their surrounding. Also, at one building they have integrated the security measures 
into the overall design of the building, and with the same materials (see 5.17a). You cannot really tell 
that they are placed there because of security reasons, but they do prevent cars from coming too close 
to the building.  
Some of the measures, 5.17c, d and e, are obvious temporary, and it looks like they are not there all the 
time (which is true for 5.17d), and can be removed easily if a vehicle wants to enter the zone with 
permission. Measures like 5.17a are everlasting, and like 5.17b are long lasting. They are implemented 
permanently to make the environment safer. It looks like, the implementers have spend more time 
and money on the design of these measures, which is accountable for the way they look. 
The effects of the measures on and around Wall Street are twofold. On the one hand, they look very 
aggressive and do the measures itself, by just being implemented, create a feeling of insecurity. They 
look cheap and temporary and do not influence the users of this area positively. On the other hand, 
they have tried to make some measures look nice and because of that they do not really emit a feeling 
of insecurity. Some are even user-friendly and can be sit on. These do not really affect the safety 
feelings of users of this area. The only thing that can be said about all of these measures, is that they 
prohibit vehicular traffic to enter the area, without permission. In this way they influence the way 
people used to use this area.  
 
Battery Park, a small business district along the Hudson River is shown on figure 5.18. This area 
consists of a lot of office buildings, and to a lesser extent bank buildings also. The protected objects 
here are these buildings and also, the boulevard along the nearby marina. The type and design of the 
protection measure we see here can simply be qualified as non-artistically. A little police patrol office, 
huge metal fence-like measures with red coloured stop signs (see 5.18b and c) dominate the 
streetscapes here. At another intersection, just laying down rocks has closed the road, which prevents 
entering from vehicular traffic (see 5.18a). Despite the accompany of better looking bollards, the 
measures make you aware of the present threat of a terrorist attack. They create a ‘no go’ zone and 













Figure 5.18 Battery Park, New York City 
 
one, these kinds of measures have been implemented here. If the threat is getting less the measures 
can be removed really quickly, and the original user-friendly situation can be restored.  
Again, the effect for the users of this area is that they cannot reach this area close by car. They can 
walk around the area freely, but because of these worse, aggressive looking measures they can feel 
more insecure than without these measures.  
 
 
Figure 5.19 Broadway, New York City 
 
The photographs on figure 5.19 have been taken on Broadway, New York City. 5.19a and b show a 
situation at a corner where a bank building is situated.  
The planters have been installed just to prevent for possible attacks or, in case of an accident, for cars 
to drive into its front façade. Although they can be removed pretty easily, they are long lasting, 
because the risk of a traffic accident on this busy intersection is always present.  
  




They do really affect the way citizens use the sideways. Streams of passers-by get deregulated when 
they want to enter the sidewalks after the crossing, as can be seen on 5.19a. Both protection measures 
do not really provoke feelings of insecurity, to a certain degree they look nice and friendly. 
 
 
Figure 5.20 CNN broadcast building, New York City 
 
At the end of Broadway, the broadcast building of CNN is settled (see figure 5.20). CNN is the 
number one national television station, and therefore has a lot  of national symbolic value. The 
protection measures are stylish bollards, in harmony with the design of the building. They have been 
implemented everlasting, not only because of possible attacks, but also because the building is 
situated at a roundabout and is an easy target for cars to hit in the case of an accident. That is also the 
reason why these anti-ram bollards have been implemented. The effect of the measures at the CNN 
building is very minimal. You cannot park your car at that site anyway, and it is prohibited to park at 
the sideways as well. Also, they do not constrain any ones ability to move around the site, since they 
are not of such a size that you have to get round them.  




5.3.2  Conclusion 
The case study in New York City has shown that terrorist attack protection measures appear in a lot of 
different types and designs. Also, the spheres they emit differ, just like the effects they have for 
citizens in terms of constraining their ability to move around the site freely. The examples of Wall 
Street can be marked as ‘worst case scenario’. They do not look ‘friendly’, and contrast with the 
environment they stand in. The measures are too obvious protection measures and therefore they may 
provoke feelings of insecurity. Maybe, if only more time and money was spend on designing this area, 
in terms of protection, they could have been in more harmony with the environment. 
 
The following table shows the valuations, in terms of yes (+), neutral (0), or no (-), of the variables 
analysed in the different examples of New York City: 
 
   Symbolic  Economic  Design of pro-  Harmony with  Effect for  Effect for  Create feelings  Effect for  
  
value  value  tection measure  surrounding  pedestrians  vehicles  of insecurity  urban design 
 Figure 5.17  +  +  0  0  +  +  +  + 
 Figure 5.18  -  +  -  -  -  +  +  + 
 Figure 5.19  -  +  +  +  +  -  -  + 
 Figure 5.20  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  0 








5.4  Case study Washington D.C. 
Washington,  District of Columbia, is the nation’s Capital City, also known as the Federal City. In this 
administrative district of the U.S.A., the centres of all three branches of the U.S. federal government, as 
well as the headquarters of most federal agencies are located. Washington also serves as the 
headquarters for the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the Organization of American States, among other 
international (and national) institutions. Because of this, often 
massive political demonstrations and protests take place, 
particularly on the National Mall, the site of numerous 
national landmarks, monuments and museums (see figure 
5.22). The Mall stretches from the Lincoln Memorial on the 
western border to the Capitol on the east. The Mall is 
surrounded by world known museums, memorials and other 
monuments, which makes it a very popular tourist attraction 
in the U.S.A.  This case study examines examples of terrorist 
attack protection measures at buildings on and around this 
National Mall. 
Figure 5.22 The National Mall in Washington D.C. (source: Wikipedia; The Free Encyclopedia 2004) 
 
5.4.1  Analysis of the photograph collages of Washington D.C. 
 
 
Figure 5.23 Downtown Washington D.C. (source: National Capital Planning System 2002) 
 
The photographs of figure 5.23 are taken by the National Capital Planning System for ‘The National 
Capital Urban Design and Security Plan’. This plan designs protection measures for Washington D.C., 
by either implement them in existing conditions, or design and develop complete new situations. On 
5.23c, ‘The Washington Monument’, which honours the first president of the U.S.A., is protected by 
jersey barriers, which prevent cars from coming too close to the monument. These jersey barriers are 
temporary and are being removed as soon as the new, integrated security measures are ready.   




On 5.23f we see existing conditions at the White House. The whole area around the White House is 
secured by using a large black fence, which separates the site from the sidewalk, and the sidewalk is 
separated from the streets by using bollards, which makes it a double anti-ram protection. As long as 
the president of the U.S.A. will live in the White House, these protection measures are there to stay. 
Figures 5.23a, b, d and e show different situations in Washington D.C. that are protected by either 
jersey barriers, or planters. Again, these jersey barriers are designed and developed to stay temporary, 
so they are not incorporated into existing situations and that can make them look unstylish and 
unfriendly. 
The effects of the shown measures here in terms of feelings of insecurity are quite large. Most of them 
are not integrated into the overall urban design and look like they are placed haphazardly. Only at the 
White House the protection measures are in harmony with their surrounding and are of a proper 
design. In terms of constraining the ability to move around, they do have effects for users of the area 
they are placed in. The jersey barriers are measures that regulate traffic and prohibit cars to go into 
streets and close off some streets completely as well. 
Figure 5.24 Federal triangle, Washington D.C. 
 
The photographs of figure 5.24 a and b are made in the Federal Triangle in Washington. It contains a 
number of federal offices and government buildings. These planters have a classic design and they fit 
with the appearance and design of the buildings in their surrounding. They are placed long lasting, 
but as soon as the threat for attacks is diminished, they can be removed easily and the openness of the   




area can be restored. It can be accepted that the effect for the users of this area is zero, because they 
look nice and do not provoke feelings of insecurity, but that is a subjective judgement, and can differ 
from person to person.  They sure do not constrain any ones ability to move around the area, because 
you are not allowed to enter by car anyway. Also, you do not have to get round the planters to come 
close to the buildings.  
The example of 5.24c is of a totally different kind. Protected here is the area around the Library of 
Congress, the world its largest library. The type of protection measure we see here is very aggressive 
and prevents you from using a street, which you probably could use in the past. Also, the bollards are 
placed closed to each other, which makes the sidewalks less accessible. The bollards seem to be pretty 
long lasting, and the measure in the middle of the road can be made active by putting up the fence in 
such a way that the stop signs are visible. The effects for users of this site are pretty high. Due to their 
appearance they can easily cause feelings of insecurity, and also they really constrain you to move 
around the area freely. 
 
5.4.2  Conclusion 
Washington D.C. is the nation its capital city and has the most federal and governmental offices, as 
well as monuments and memorials, of the country. All this, makes that this city has a large symbolic 
national value, despite the fact that is does not have a lot of business or financial areas. 
The protection measures at stake here are therefore most of the time of a serious kind. Because 
Washington D.C. is seen as the city of all the Americans, an attack on any building with a symbolic 
function in Washington D.C. touches the lives of millions of Americans. 
After the “9/11” the number of protection measures implemented has increased, which is the reason 
that so many temporary jersey barriers dominate the streetscapes. And, because of these barriers, in 
Washington D.C. most of the protection measures can constrain your ability to move around. But, in 
the nearby future, this will be less, because of the National Urban Design and Security Plan. They 
create new measures, which are more integrated into the overall design and therefore look less 
obvious, and they improve existing conditions. 
 
The following table shows the valuations, in terms of yes (+), neutral (0), or no (-), of the variables 
analysed in the different examples of Washington D.C.: 
  
Symbolic  Economic  Design of pro-  Harmony with  Effect for  Effect for Create feelings Effect for  
  
value  value  tection measure  surrounding  pedestrians  vehicles  of insecurity  urban design
 Figure 5.23a, b  -  -  -  -  -  +  0  + 
 Figure 5.23c  +  -  -  -  -  -  +  + 
 Figure 5.23d  -  -  +  +  +  -  -  0 
 Figure 5.23e  +  -  -  -  -  +  +  + 
 Figure 5.23f  +  -  +  +  -  -  0  0 
 Figure 5.24a, b  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  0 
 Figure 5.24c  +  -  -  -  +  +  +  + 
Table 5.25 Valuation table variables case studies Washington D.C.         




5.5  Conclusion case studies in the U.S.A. 
After having done the three case studies, one thing is remarkable: the difference in the design of the 
protection measures between the three cities. At first, it has to be said that there is a difference in the 
design of the measures between the facts if it is a city owned facility or a private owned. In case of 
protection measures at private owned buildings (Sears Tower, CNN building), they seem to be 
incorporated more into the overall design of the building and the site. 
 
Secondly, even between city owned facilities in the three cities there is a difference. In Chicago, it 
looks like more time and money is spend on a proper layout and design of the protection measures. 
To explain this, one can say that the threat for a terrorist attack is not as high as in the two other cities, 
who both have been the scene for terrorist attacks on “9/11”. Because of that, in New York City and in 
Washington D.C. protection measures have been implemented rapidly and haphazardly. So, it seems 
that time, money and threat level can be held accountable for terrorist attack protection measures to 
look nice and to be in good harmony with the building they protect. That can be concluded if you look 
at the difference between the cities. 
 
Thirdly, if you look at the protection measures itself, it can be concluded that the effects they have for 
users of specific buildings and/ or sites differ in the type and design of the measures. This is also a 
result of the site they are implemented in, what means the difference between the way people used to 
use the site and the way they can or have to use it now because of the implementation of the 
measures. Nice looking planters, or small bollards of a proper stylish material do not necessarily have 
to look like they are protection measures. Some are even user-friendly and can be sit on. Some of the 
measures as we have seen on Wall Street in New York City and near some monuments in Washington 
D.C., look aggressive and they can easily provoke feelings of insecurity. But, that judgement is not 






















6  Case studies in The Netherlands  
 
The following chapter will analyze three case studies in The Netherlands. These case studies have 
been done in the three biggest cities based on inhabitants; Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. 
Amsterdam is the capital city of The Netherlands, Rotterdam is an important industrial city because of 
its international known harbour and The Hague is the political and royal capital. 
The case studies will be analyzed using the same systematic as in the preliminary chapter. The 
different photograph collages will be analyzed using the same methodology (description of protected 
object, type and design of protection measure, categorize the protection measure as temporary or long 
lasting, and the effect of the protection measure for the users of affected areas). Also, after each case 
study a table with a valuation of eight different analyzed variables will be given.  
Interviews with responsible officers of the three different municipalities have been held. By executing 
this interviews, Mr. H. v.d. Vet (The Hague), Mr. D. Berg (Rotterdam) and Mr. M. Schilstra 
(Amsterdam) provided information on terrorist attack protection in their municipalities. Quotes of 
these interviews are interweaved throughout the text. The complete notes of these interviews can be 
found in the appendices (D, E and F). Also, an informal conversation has been held with Mr. H. Croes 
and Mr. R. Geerligs of the Government Buildings Agency. 
 
Before the results of the case studies in The Netherlands will be given, some background information 
on terrorist protection and prevention in The Netherlands will be given. Outlining the goals and tasks 
of the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS) will do this.  
 
 
6.1  General Intelligence and Security Service 
The Dutch government has worked hard since “9/11” on better protecting against terrorist attacks in 
The Netherlands. They invested in the capacity of the General Intelligence and Security Service, in The 
Netherlands known as the  Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, and also the exchange of 
information has been improved. This is shown by the ‘Action Plan on the Fight against Terrorism and 
Security’  (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst 2004). It contains a package of measures with which the 
government wishes to step up the f ight against terrorism. It concerns both the reinforcement of 
existing policy and new accents and priorities and focuses on prevention of terrorist attacks and to 
prosecute terrorists. In order to deal effectively with the protection and security of vulnerable persons 
and objects the intelligence and security services are provided with extra resources. 
 
The GISS will take measures to counteract acute situations of threat. In the event of a threat, various 
authorities and organizations will be called according to the existing lines of authority, to monitor and 
secure people and institutions in The Netherlands. This can involve evacuations, roadblocks, halting 
train and air traffic or stopping telephone communication in a certain region (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst 
2004). Also, the GISS advances the security of the government and parts of the economic life. They 
advise about crucial security efforts. The physical security task is just a little part of that.  
An early warning system will inform agencies, companies and citizens about any increased risk for 
terrorist attacks. The GISS recognizes an important development in the current threat of terrorism.   




It does not only focus on vital goals anymore, but it can also strive for as much victims as possible. 
Potential goals are defined as soft targets, and will be drawn up in a list (Algemene Inlichtingen- en 
Veiligheidsdienst 2005). These are places where a lot of people come together without much security, 
like railway stations and restaurants and bars. The government will identify these soft targets as well 
as any steps to be taken in a situation of threat. This includes potential targets that may form an 
increased risk due to the nature of the target. Extra capacity will be created to increase tracing, 
monitoring and disrupting individuals who are internationally considered to be potential terrorists.   
 
The cooperation across the entire area of combating terrorism is raised to a structurally higher level. 
On the national level, there is cooperation between the General Intelligence and Security Service, 
National Police Agency, Immigration and Naturalisation Service, and the Public Prosecution Service. 
This is called the CT-Infobox (contra-terrorism information box) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en 
Veiligheidsdienst 2005). The CT-Infobox is researching the threats and risks concerning these people, 
institutions and their property. They also criticize the current level of security. Combining all of the 
available resources will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the government. Information will be 
gathered, analysed and used more efficiently, sufficient instruments will be available to ensure timely 
action and prospective targets will be protected adequately. What they do is monitoring and 
surveying of people, institutions and their buildings on a continuous level, to make a threat 
assessment. All efforts will be combined under the authority of the National Anti-Terrorism 
Coordinator (Ministerie van Justitie 2005). The coordinator will be responsible for policy development, 
analysis of (intelligence) information and directing security measures in combating terrorism. This is 
intended to facilitate a realistic threat analysis at any given time. The coordinator will also be 
responsible for directing security, i.e. identifying (vital) targets, developing and implementing an 
early warning system, and monitoring implemented measures. 
 
The Netherlands will have to continue to monitor significant acts of terrorism for the foreseeable 
future. The government’s ability to tackle the terrorist threat effectively will be determined by: 
obtaining and using information efficiently; the resources and powers provided to enable a timely 
response; adequate surveillance and security of prospective targets; a cross-border approach and 
limiting the breeding ground for recruiting potential perpetrators (Ministerie van Justitie 2005). 
 
 
6.2        Case study The Hague 
With almost 470.000 inhabitants (Gemeente Den Haag 2005), The Hague is the 3rd largest city in The 
Netherlands.  Being the court capital (the government and the royal residence), it has an important 
function for The Netherlands. It accommodates different royal palaces, the nation’s most important 
governmental buildings, and some foreign embassies and consulates. Also, the International Court of 
Justice is accommodated in The Hague. Besides the photographs collages, this case study will be 
discussed by using an interview with Mr. H. v.d. Vet, responsible officer of the Department of Public 
Order and Safety of the municipality of The Hague.   




6.2.1  Analysis of the photograph collages of The Hague 
 
 
Figure 6.1 U.S. embassy, The Hague 
 
The first photograph collage (figure 6.1) shows the U.S. embassy at the ‘Korte Voorhout’ in The 
Hague. Because it is regarded as a part of the U.S.A. in The Netherlands, this building is seen as one of 
the most threatened ones in The Netherlands. For terrorists, it could be a good target on U.S. property 
on Dutch soil. That may be the reason for having so much physical protection; it has three different 
zones of protection. The exterior zone consists of red and white-chained roadblocks, the middle zone 
has one-meter high metal fences, and the inner zone is filled with policemen and/or guards. Also, a 
white police unit is housed in this zone for extra surveillance. Design wise, the implemented security 
measures seem not to be in harmony with their surrounding. The type of material is not the same as 
the protected object and that is the reason why the measures are so obvious. The implemented 
security measures are of a temporary kind and can be removed easily. As soon as the embassy moves, 
and the building gets another, less threatening, function, the protection measures will be taken away, 
and the site layout can be restored. 
These measures have a large effect for the users of the site. The pavement and the cycle path have 
been removed and replaced together in one lane, separated from each other by a metal framework. 
This influences the space pedestrians and cyclists have to walk or cycle. Also, a large part of what 
used to be public space (pavement, slopes or lawn) has been incorporated for implementing the 
different zones of security.   




Altogether, the implemented physical protection measures are fortress-like and can make you the 
enjoy the site less, because they send out a feeling of aggressiveness and unfriendliness.  
 
 
Figure 6.2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague  
 
In figure 6.2 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been examined. This governmental building has a 
certain symbolic function as representing the foreign contacts The Netherlands has. The protection  
measures we see here are long lasting (6.2a), as well as temporary (6.2b). The long lasting measures 
are incorporated into the existing situation by using the same high quality materials as the building 
itself is made of. They have heightened the pavement to such a level that vehicles cannot ride onto this 
and the cycle path is fenced off by using a bollard; this also impedes vehicles from riding onto the 
cycle path or pavement. The temporary red and white roadblocks also fence off the building from the 
road and cycle path; but they can be removed easily when the risk of a terrorist attack is diminished. 
The effect for users is very minimal here, because the pavement and cycle path can still be used to the 
same extent. But, the temporary roadblocks just show that you are entering a site with a high threat or 
risk of an attack or any other inconvenient situation.  
 
The third photograph collage (figure 6.3) shows five different situations of physical protection  
measures i n downtown The Hague. 6.3a shows the entrance of the ‘Binnenhof’ (the centre of 
government). Here, the office of the prime minister and parliament is situated. Implemented bollards 
and flower boxes, supplied with police surveillance, fence off the entrance. The protection measures 
are long lasting and in harmony with the surrounding, except for the policemen and car. The bollards 
can sink into the ground, to let cars enter the site after a thorough inspection by the police. The effect 
for users here is minimal. It has never been publicly accessible by car; only by appointment. So, these 
measures do not incorporate public space. You still can enter the site by foot without going through 
security. And, the measures are relatively subtle, so they do not really influence the appearance of the 
‘Binnenhof’. Figures 6.3b and c are examples of respectively the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons and (a part of) the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; who both 
have a certain symbolic value and for this reason are buildings/organizations at high risk. In the 
example of 6.3b, the security measures have been implemented properly and fit into the layout of the 
site and with the appearance of the building.   




Except for the entrance for the parking garage, the building is not accessible by car (which it had never 
been before), because you cannot park your car around the building, so the effect for users is very 
minimal here as well.  It still is accessible for pedestrians, and there is a pavement and cycle path in 
front of the building. Since the protection measures are incorporated during the building of the 
building, they are long lasting, and cannot be replaced easily. 6.3c attracts people’s attention, because 
of the police car and the little office; this makes people more aware of a threat. 
  
Figure 6.3 Five different security situations in downtown The Hague 
 
Figure 6.3d shows the example of Intrum Justitia; a provider of credit management services. This 
organization is a justice building on a corporate or personal level. It does not have a symbolic (Dutch) 
value, nor any national economic value, but still it can have a value reaching into a personal sphere, 
because it tries to solve ‘conflicts’ between two parties. The protection measures implemented here a 
of a long lasting kind, and are incorporated into the building’s design by implementing flower boxes 
which impede cars from driving into the façade. They do not have any influence on any user of the 
building or site. 
The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment is shown in figure 6.3e. This Dutch 
governmental building does not have an economic or symbolic value directly. Only protecting the 
backside of the building, these flower boxes fit well into the layout and design of the site and building. 
The flower boxes can be removed easily, but that would give the building a higher risk of cars coming   




too close to the building. There is not any effect for users of this site and building. It is still publicly 
accessible by feet, and you are not allowed to park your car around the building anyway.  
 
6.2.2  Conclusion 
This case study has shown that The Hague has a certain risk for terrorist attacks, because it is the court 
capital of The Netherlands, an for that reason has many governmental buildings, but also because of 
the international organization who are housed here. Especially the U.S. embassy is of great influence 
for the inhabitants of The Hague. According to Mr. H. v.d. Vet (2005), responsible officer of the 
Department of Public Order and Safety, the municipality would like to see the U.S. embassy moving 
out of the inner city, because in their opinion it brings a unacceptable threat for a terrorist attack. The 
photographs have shown that the protection measures are placed haphazardly, and that they have 
incorporated a large part of what used to be public space. Also, the pavement and the cycle path have 
been replaced, so the effect for the users of this site can be qualified as pretty high.  
The Hague also has examples where the protection measures have been implemented very properly 
into the existing situation of the site or the design of the building. The example of 6.3b, d and e taught 
us this. In most of the cases the measures have been implemented right during the building of the 
object, and in other examples the security measures are flower boxes, which are regarded as livening 
up the site and/ or building.  ‘The difference lies within the design of the site around the protected object’, 
according to Van de Vet (2005), ‘in The Hague we try as much a we can to take the existing situation into 
account… but the site layout is decisive whether you can solve it on a naturally way, or if do not have enough 
space to do this’.  
 
The following table shows the valuations, in terms of yes (+), neutral (0), or no (-), of the variables 
analysed in the different examples of The Hague: 
 
  
Symbolic  Economic  Design of pro-  Harmony with  Effect for  Effect for  Create feelings  Effect for  
  
value  value  tection measure  surrounding  pedestrians  vehicles  of insecurity  urban design 
 Figure 6.1  +  -  -  -  +  +  +  + 
 Figure 6.2  +  0  0  0  +  0  +  + 
 Figure 6.3a  +  -  +  +  -  +  0  + 
 Figure 6.3b  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  0 
 Figure 6.3c  +  -  -  -  -  -  +  + 
 Figure 6.3d  +  0  +  +  -  -  -  - 
 Figure 6.3e  +  0  +  +  -  -  -  0 
Table 6.4 Valuation table variables case studies The Hague         
  




6.3      Case study Rotterdam 
Rotterdam, the second largest city has approximately 600.000 inhabitants (Gemeente Rotterdam 2005). 
Rotterdam is worldwide known for its harbour, which is the largest of the world. Its population is 
highly multicultural; it consists of almost 60% of different ethnical groups.  
This case study examines a Jewish synagogue in a neighbourhood called ‘Hilligersberg’, a jeweller at 
the ‘Schieweg’ and a bank building just outside the main shopping area in the inner city of Rotterdam. 
Besides the photograph collages, this case study will be discussed by using an interview with Mr. D. 
Berg, responsible officer of the Department of Public Order and Safety of the municipality of 
Rotterdam.     
 
6.3.1  Analysis of the photograph collages of Rotterdam 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Jewish synagogue, Rotterdam 
 
At figure 6.5 we see a Jewish synagogue in the neighbourhood called ‘Hilligersberg’, just outside 
downtown Rotterdam. This synagogue has a lot of symbolic (religious) value and has had physical 
protection for many years already. After the murder of Van Gogh last November and the commotion 
it gave afterwards, the Jewish community asked for better protection. The synagogue used to be 
protected by bollards at the front and on one side of the building (6.5a and b), but last winter it also 
got bollards at the back and at the other side of the building (see figure 6.5c and d). Those bollards are  
  




in the same colour as the pavement and the colour of the building, so they are in good harmony with 
their surrounding. They are digged into the ground, which means that they have been implemented to 
last long, but if the threat is diminishing they can be removed and the site can be restored. There are 
no  side effects for the users of this site and building. You are not allowed to park your car on the 
pavement or lawn anyway, so the bollards do not impede anyone. There is enough space left for 
pedestrians to use the pavement. Also, the bollards do not look aggressive; they do not really send out 
a feeling of insecurity. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Jeweller, Rotterdam 
 
A jeweller at the ‘Schieweg’ in Rotterdam who has implemented anti-ram bollards can be seen at 
figure 6.6. This building has a large economical value and is a vulnerable object for robberies. 
Coloured stylish and skilful anti-ram bollards, to protect its front façade against cars driving into this 
building, protect the building. This is protection against criminals and robberies more, than protection 
against real terrorist attacks, but it is interesting to see how those anti-ram bollards can also be 
implemented in a colourful statue-like manner. They are implemented to last as long as the jeweller is 
housed in this building. The effect for users here is very minimal. Yes, you have to get round them, 
because they stand in the middle of the pavement, but it is restricted to ride here with your bicycle or 
car anyway. And, accepted can be that they influence the site positively, because they are 
implemented as being art objects, and that is how they look also.  
 
What can be seen at figure 6.7 is a bank building right outside the main shopping area in downtown 
Rotterdam. This bank building has economical value and is protected by one layer of security, at the 
perimeter line. Bollards have been implemented, attached to each other with metal chains, to prevent 
cars from coming too close to the building in case of a robbery or to deliver a bomb. As long lasting 
measures, they are in good harmony with the building and site itself and do not really look like as 
being physical security measures. They do not have any influence on the user its behaviour; the streets 
are still completely accessible for cars and bicycles, and pedestrians can still use the site and enter the 
building the way they want to. You are just not allowed to park your car at the site, but that has not 
been changed after the implementations, because the implementations have been done during the 
building of the building itself already.    




   
Figure 6.7 Fortis Bank, Rotterdam 
 
6.3.2  Conclusion 
Rotterdam has shown us that also religious objects are at risk of terrorist attacks. ‘A Jewish synagogue 
has asked for more physical protection measures after the murder of Van Gogh last November’, said Mr. D. 
Berg (2005). ‘It had protection at the front and at one side, but not at the backside of the building… and now the 
bollards are already implemented’.  
The jeweller at the ‘Schieweg’ shows another, remarkable, example of physical protection. Here, the 
jeweller did implement anti-ram bollards to prevent cars from driving into its façade in case of an 
accident or robbery. This is not really an example of anti-terrorism protection measures, but an 
example of how artistic these measures also can be designed; the bollards are painted as being a man 
and woman standing in front of the shop. This shows that the measures do not always have to be one-
coloured, or of the same size. Much is possible to make the measures look like they are not really anti-
terrorism measures, but art objects. 
In Rotterdam, we have not seen, the ‘serious’ kind of physical protection measures, as we have seen 
already in New York City or in The Hague. That is because of the functions of the protected objects 
here. They do not really possess any national value, only the synagogue has some symbolic (religious) 
value. 
 
The following table shows the valuations, in terms of yes (+), neutral (0), or no (-), of the variables 
analysed in the different examples of Rotterdam: 
 
  
Symbolic  Economic  Design of pro-  Harmony with  Effect for  Effect for  Create feelings  Effect for  
  
value  value  tection measure  surrounding  pedestrians  vehicles  of insecurity  urban design 
 Figure 6.5  +  -  +  +  +  -  0  + 
 Figure 6.6  -  +  +  0  +  -  -  0 
 Figure 6.7  -  +  +  +  -  -  -  - 
Table 6.8 Valuation table variables case studies Rotterdam         
  




6.4      Case study Amsterdam 
The nations capital city (and largest city) has approximately 740.000 inhabitants (Gemeente 
Amsterdam 2005). Only being the capital city can already make Amsterdam a city with a relatively 
high terrorist threat.  The question if this presumption is true, shall be tried to answer by examining 
different locations and interviewing Mr. M. Schilstra, responsible officer from the Department of 
Public Order and Safety of the municipality of Amsterdam.    
 
6.4.1  Analysis of the photograph collages of Amsterdam 
 
 
Figure 6.9 The Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam 
 
At figure 6.9 we see the Nederlandsche Bank in Amsterdam. It has great economical and symbolic 
value; economical because of being a bank and representing economic life in The Netherlands, and 
symbolic because of being Dutch and state owned. An attack on the Nederlandsche Bank can be seen 
as an attack on The Netherlands itself, but also on the Dutch economy. The protection measures being 
in place here are of a naturally kind: flower boxes. They last as long as the Dutch Bank is housed in 
this building and the measures are in good harmony with the site and the building. They interfere 
pretty well with their surrounding. The protection measures have no influence on the users of this site 
and building. They do not really look like as being protection measures. The only influence they can 
have is positively, as being beautiful in bringing more green onto the site. They do not restrict cyclist 
or pedestrians to use the site freely, and they only restrict cars from approaching the building too 
close.    
  






Figure 6.10 U.S. consulate, Amsterdam 
 
The highly threatened U.S. consulate at the ‘Museum Square’ in Amsterdam can be seen at figure 6.10. 
Being one of the two best-protected  objects in The Netherlands, this building has a far-reaching 
symbolic value. Four levels of security protect this U.S. building in the middle of Amsterdam. The 
perimeter line is a line of flower boxes, metal fences protect the approach zone, black metal fences 
protect the building exterior, and guards and surveillance cameras protect the building interior. Two 
police cars and a police office are surveying the whole site. The measures are as well temporary as 
long lasting. The police surveillance can be removed as soon as the threat is diminished, the perimeter 
line also, but the building exterior and interior security will probably be there as long as the consulate 
will be housed in this building. 
The effect for the users of as well the site as the building is quite large. A big part of what used to be 
public space is incorporated (see figure 6.10d). And you have to pass three security points if you want 
to enter the building. There is no direct influence for car drivers or cyclists. But, the whole entourage 
seems pretty aggressive and can create a feeling of insecurity. Mostly because of the presence of so 
much police and other security measures. It attracts attention and can make you aware of the threat 
and make you think you are entering a ‘no go’ zone, which makes you enjoy the site and/ or building 
less.  




6.4.2  Conclusion 
Amsterdam only has one building which is highly threatened; the U.S. consulate at the Museum 
Square. Together with the U.S. embassy in The Hague, they represent the U.S.A. in The Netherlands. 
That seems enough reason to protect the buildings as much as possible. The building in Amsterdam is 
protected with all four security zones and is being surveyed by police at two sides of the building as 
well. The photographs show that the protection measures incorporate a part of what used to be public 
space also, which makes the site less accessible (Schilstra 2005).  
There are not many buildings at high risk in Amsterdam, because there are not many national 
governmental buildings or buildings with an international function. However, there are a lot of events 
that get protected against possible attacks. ‘Last January Iraqi elections have been held in Amsterdam. The 
navy area was protected with security measures better than normally. A street has been partially closed off, a bus 
stop has been closed, and we gave out some prohibitions for cars’, according to Schilstra (2005). These 
measures got a lot of resistance, because they have a direct influence on public space: ‘After the Iraqi 
elections we got a lot of letters from complaining citizens. They had to make detours, they had to park elsewhere 
or could not use the bus stop’.  
The measures at the Nederlandsche Bank seem to be in good harmony with the surrounding; the 
flower boxes are stylish and liven up the site. ‘In principle, we try as much as possible to incorporate the 
measures into the existing situation. That is why you see the flower boxes so much’, according to Schilstra 
(2005). 
 
The following table shows the valuations, in terms of yes (+), neutral (0), or no (-), of the variables 
analysed in the different examples of Amsterdam: 
 
   Symbolic  Economic  Design of pro-  Harmony with  Effect for  Effect for  Create feelings  Effect for  
  
value  value  tection measure  surrounding  pedestrians  vehicles  of insecurity  urban design 
 Figure 6.9  +  +  +  +  -  -  -  - 
 Figure 6.10  +  -  -  -  +  -  +  + 
Table 6.11 Valuation table variables case studies Amsterdam         
 
  




6.5  Conclusions case studies in The Netherlands 
The three case studies in The Netherlands have shown that also in The Netherlands, the protection 
measures differ as they differ in being implemented to protect state-owned or private objects. The 
example of Intrum Justitia (The Hague), Fortis Bank and the jeweller (both Rotterdam) are all 
examples of private parties implementing protection measures to protect their own property. And, 
although it has never been said, it looks like they have more money to spend on this. The measures are 
all incorporated into the design of the site or building properly, and do not really hinder any ones 
ability to move around the site or use the site freely. 
The two examples of ‘serious’ protection measures are the U.S. embassy in The Hague and the U.S. 
consulate in Amsterdam. This is not very remarkable, since we have learned from earlier case studies 
done in the U.S.A. that most of the protection measures at stake here are of a serious kind as well. The 
Dutch examples both incorporate public space, and have far reaching consequences for the users of 
these sites or buildings. Pavements and cycle paths have been replaced, policemen, police cars, and 
police offices are also normal in these environments. Although it has not been measured or 
researched, accepted can be that these measures make you feel uncomfortable at least. They are not 
designed very pretty and they are too obvious being protection measures.  
All of these case studies in The Netherlands have also shown, just like the case studies in the U.S.A. 
that the effect they have for pedestrians, cyclists or car drivers, depends on the way of 
implementation, the design and the size. If they are integrated into to overall design of the site to a 



































7  Conclusions and recommendations 
 
After having done the literature review and having made a theoretical framework in the first phase of 
the research, and doing the case studies in The U.S.A. and in The Netherlands in the second and third 
phase, this chapter tries to draw conclusions and give recommendations.  
To draw conclusions, the research questions will be answered. Answering these questions will give an 
answer to the question if this research’s goal has been reached. After the conclusions 
recommendations for the U.S.A. as well as for The Netherlands will be given.  
 
 
7.1    Answering the research questions   
In the introduction a goal has been set to have a better guidance in doing this research. It has tried to 
give a closer look on how terrorist attack protection measures are being incorporated in urban design 
principles, in the U.S.A. and in The Netherlands. Therefore, the goal has been: 
 
To explore to what degree and in which way urban design in the U.S.A. and in The Netherlands can and, 
according to urban designers and the general public, may help to protect buildings and/or sites against terrorist 
attacks. 
 
The following four research questions were the lead during this thesis. After each question, the 
answer will be given.    
 
1.  What can be done in urban design to protect buildings and/or sites against terrorist attacks, and what 
has already been done? 
The question ‘what can be done’ was easy to find out by reviewing literature concerning terrorist 
attack protection measures and target hardening. Combs ( 1997) and Conrath (1999) say that 
implementing security can be done by implementing operational and/or physical security. 
Operational security (guards, sensors, closed-circuit television, and other electronic devices) has not 
much influence on urban design, because buildings and/or sites are not being built or altered for this. 
They are just ‘added on’ security measures. Physical security, on the other hand, has as its objective 
‘hardening the target against which an attack may be made’ (Combs 1997). These  measures are 
fortress walls, fences, Jersey barriers, bollards, gates, flower boxes or measures like street furniture, 
and have a direct influence on the city’s urban design. They are easy to see and regard as protection 
measures. The protection measures can be implemented in four different layers of security: perimeter 
line, approach zone, building exterior and building interior (Conrath 1999). For this study’s goal, only 
perimeter line, approach zone, and building exterior are important, because they have a direct impact 
on the city’s façade. They can be seen from the streets and can influence the way people see or use the 
city and its streets.  
The question ‘what has already been done’ could only be answered by doing case studies. In the 
U.S.A. and in The Netherlands, six case studies have been done to find out if, and to what extent 
physical protection measures have been implemented.  It turned out that most of the buildings with 
implemented protection measures, are buildings with representative functions, like governmental   




buildings, and consulates or embassies. Also, a lot of bank buildings are being protected, and whole 
financial areas like Wall Street and Battery Park in New York City.  
The examples have taught us that the extent of threat for terrorist attacks is guiding for the extent of 
protection measures being implemented. In the U.S.A., the Wall Street area is the utmost protected. It 
has a big economical and symbolic value, and with the attacks of “9/11” in mind, it is totally closed-off 
for vehicular traffic. In The Netherlands, the U.S. embassy in The Hague and the U.S. consulate in 
Amsterdam are to the utmost protected, with four levels of security. They represent a real threat for 
the Dutch society, because they are regarded as being a part of the U.S. in The Netherlands.   
 
2.  What, according to urban designers and the general public, can and may be done to protect buildings 
and/or sites against terrorist attacks? 
This question can be divided into two different parts; the urban designers and the general public. 
Interviews have been held with responsible officers from municipalities regarding the case studies. It 
turned out that all the officers have the opinion that safety is the number one goal in the task of 
protection against terrorist attacks. However, it is also their responsibility (or from their department as 
a whole, with a mayor being responsible in the end) to disturb public life as less as possible. 
According to the officers, you will always have to make a consideration between safety for everyone, 
and maintaining public order for everybody. You have to implement security measures, without a 
doubt, but you will also have to keep the quality of life of every citizen. Some protection measures do 
have an influence on how pedestrians, cyclists or car drivers can use the site and/or building. Among 
other influences, those measures incorporate public space or close-off streets partially.  
A responsible officer of the municipality of Amsterdam told that a lot of citizens did complain about 
the  security measures that were implemented temporary for the Iraqi elections in Amsterdam last 
January. They closed off a street partially, closed a bus stop, and gave out some prohibitions for 
parking cars. ‘You will always have to justify the measures you are implementing, as long as you tell the 
citizens it is for their own safety, it is okay’ (Schilstra 2005). To a broader extent, the general public thinks 
it is good that buildings and/or sites at risk are being protected. But, on a personal level, they do not 
want the protection measures to influence their own private life. 
 
3.  How do users of affected areas regard these terrorist attack protection measures? 
This question has been tried to answer by doing a questionnaire around the Sears Tower in Chicago. 
This questionnaire searched for citizen’s perceptions of safety regarding the Sears Tower Site. It 
turned out that 78% of the participants regard the implemented measures at the Sears Tower Site as 
positive. However, still 39% said that they felt constrained  in moving around the site freely. The 
protection measures stand in their way, or probably the cameras are being seen as ‘intruders’, instead 
of only improving their own safety. Again, users of affected areas think it is good and necessary that 
buildings and/or sites at risk are being protected. But, on a personal level, they do not want the 









4.  How can, all in all, urban design as protection measure contribute to an increase in safety? 
Urban design as a protection measure can surely contribute to an increase in safety. It prevents vehicle 
bombs from coming too close to a building and/or site. Or, it can harden the target. In the case of a 
bomb going off, the result (loss of life and capital) will be minimized, because a hardened wall will 
break the blast. This increases the level of safety. However, if only one building in a row is protected 
by physical measures, than it will only have an effect for that particular building. Not for the whole 
neighbourhood or area. The neighbour will also have to implement protection measures to protect his 
property against terrorist attacks. And, it will have to continue like that. Implementing measures at a 
site and/or building will only have the wanted effect on a larger scale, if more than one building in a 
neighbourhood will do the same. Otherwise, the attacker will move to your neighbour. 
By this means, implementing these measures will contribute to an increase in objective safety. The 
attacks will not have the result the attackers aim at. The protection measure reduces loss of life and 
property. But, objective safety is not the same as subjective safety. By implementing measures, people 
can also be made aware of a certain threat. Without the  measures they probably would not have 
known that they are approaching a site and/or building at high risk of a terrorist attack. That can make 
them feel more unsafe. That is a difference between objective and subjective safety. To conclude, 
urban design as a protection measure contributes to an increase in objective safety, but it has not been 
said that is also contributes to an increase in subjective safety.   
 
With answering the four questions above, this research’s goal has been reached. This study has 
explored to what degree and in which way urban design in the U.S.A. and in The Netherlands can 
and, according to urban designers and the general public, may help to protect buildings and/or sites 
against terrorist attacks. It turned out that the protection measures are nearly the same, and the way 
urban designers and the general public regard these measures is also nearly the same. The difference 
between the two countries lies in the extent of the threat for terrorist attacks to occur.  
 
 
7.2    Recommendations  
After having seen two different countries and the way and extent they implement physical protection 
against terrorism it may be useful to see if the U.S.A. can learn from the way The Netherlands is doing 
this, or vice versa.  
In the U.S.A. the threat is conceived as higher, also because of their history of terrorist attacks on 
buildings and sites. And, maybe this legitimates their way of protecting buildings and/or sites at high 
risk. If we look at some examples in New York City and Washington D.C. the implemented security 
measures do contribute negatively to the urban design of these cities. They are not really designed 
nicely, and can easily make people more aware of a threat. This can decrease the subjective safety. 
Maybe, the physical protection measures discussed in these examples could be designed better, and 
by this means fit better into the existing situation. If the protection measures do less look like as being 
protection measures, than maybe people feel less unsafe and are less aware of a present threat. 
For example, a jeweller in Rotterdam has implemented stylish artful anti-ram bollards in front of his 
shop. They do not really look like protection measures. The threat of being attacked is far less than  
  




certain buildings on Wall Street, but the same protection measures could be implemented there as 
well. The Netherlands is doing well in implementing protection measures. That is obviously a 
consequence of a threat that is lower than is the U.S.A., but the measures that are implemented in The 
Netherlands look like they fit better into the overall design of the building and site. Only two 
examples are exceptional. In The Hague and in Amsterdam two buildings are to the utmost protected 
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Survey of Citizen Perceptions of Safety Regarding the Sears Tower Site 
 
By Nico Arends, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
This survey is part of graduate student research concerning “Urban Design & Terrorism.” I am 
interested in the perceptions of safety among users of specific urban sites, and particularly the Sears 
Tower. 
 
Answering these questions will take 1-2 minutes. The information you provide will be entered into a 
data set and combined with the information collected from other people. The information will only be 
used for my research and will not be distributed to any other parties. Participation is completely 
voluntary and you can discontinue the survey at any time. 
 
If you have any further questions, please e-mail me at narends2@uiuc.edu. 
 












      
1.  How unsafe do you feel on the streets because of possible terrorist attacks? 
a.  very unsafe 
b.  somewhat unsafe 
c.  not unsafe 
 
2.  How unsafe do you feel when you are proximate to the Sears Tower? 
a.  very unsafe 
b.  somewhat unsafe 
c.  not unsafe 
 
3.  Have you noticed any protection measures at the Sears Tower since ‘9/11’?  
a.  no (go to question 7) 
b.  yes, namely……………………………………………….... 
 
4.  Do you feel safer now with this protection? 
a.  much safer 
b.  somewhat safer 
c.  not safer 
 
5.  Do any of the changes at Sears Tower constrain your ability to move around the area? 
a.  yes 
b.  no 
 
6.  Do you regard this kind of protection as positive or negative? 
a.  positive 
b.  negative 
 
7.  What is your gender?   
a.  male 
b.  female 
 
8.  Which age category are you in? 
a.  15 – 20 
b.  21 – 30 
c.  31 – 40 
d.  41 – 50 
e.  51 – 60 
f.  61 – older 
 
9.  How long have you lived or worked in the neighbourhood?  _____Years 
 













Survey of Citizen Perceptions of Safety Regarding the Sears Tower Site 
 
By Nico Arends, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
This survey is part of graduate student research concerning “Urban Design & Terrorism.” I am 
interested in the perceptions of safety among users of specific urban sites, and particularly the Sears 
Tower. 
 
Answering these questions will take 1-2 minutes. The information you provide will be entered into a 
data set and combined with the information collected from other people. The information will only be 
used for my research and will not be distributed to any other parties. Participation is completely 
voluntary and you can discontinue the survey at any time. 
 
If you have any further questions, please e-mail me at narends2@uiuc.edu. 
 













       
1.  How unsafe do you feel on the streets because of possible terrorist attacks? 
a.  very unsafe 
b.  somewhat unsafe 
c.  not unsafe 
 
2.  How unsafe do you feel when you are proximate to the Sears Tower? 
a.  very unsafe 
b.  somewhat unsafe 
c.  not unsafe 
 
3.  Have you noticed any terrorism prevention measures at the Sears Tower?  
a.  no (go to question 7) 
b.  yes, namely……………………………………………….... 
 
4.  Do such measures make you feel safer? 
a.  much safer 
b.  somewhat safer 
c.  not safer 
 
5.  Do they significantly constrain your ability to move around and enjoy the site? 
a.  yes 
b.  no 
 
6.  Do you regard this kind of protection as positive or negative? 
a.  positive 
b.  negative 
 
7.  What is your gender?   
a.  male 
b.  female 
 
8.  Which age category are you in? 
a.  15 – 20 
b.  21 – 30 
c.  31 – 40 
d.  41 – 50 
e.  51 – 60 
f.  61 - older 
 
















1.  “How unsafe do you feel on the streets because of possible terrorist attacks?” 
   Neighbours      Tourists         
  Male  Female      Male  Female     Total  
 a. very unsafe     2  2 (7%)    1  3  4 (13%)    6 (10%) 
 b. somewhat unsafe     11  11 (37%)    4  8  12 (40%)    23 (38%) 
 c. not unsafe  8  9  17 (56%)    9  5  14 (47%)    31 (52%) 
  8  22      14  16      60 
 
2.  “How unsafe do you feel when you are proximate to the Sears Tower?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
 a. very unsafe     1  1 (3%)    6  8  14 (46%)    15 (25%) 
 b. somewhat unsafe     13  13 (43%)    2  6  8 (27%)    21 (35%) 
 c. not unsafe  8  8  16 (54%)    6  2  8 (27%)    24 (40%) 
  8  22      14  16      60 
 
3.  “Have you noticed any protection measures at the Sears Tower since “9/11”?’’ 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
 a. no  4  1  5 (17%)    7  12  19 (63%)    24 (40%) 
 b. yes  4  21  25 (83%)    7  4  11 (37%)    36 (60%) 
  8  22      14  16      60 
 
4.  “Do you feel safer now with this protection?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
 a. much safer     6  6 (24%)    1     1 (10%)    7 (19%) 
 b. somewhat safer     8  8 (32%)    2  3  5 (45%)    13 (36%) 
 c. not safer  4  7  11 (44%)    4  1  5 (45%)    16 (45%) 
  4  21      7  4      36 
 
5.  “Do any of the changes at Sears Tower constrain your ability to move around?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
 a. yes  2  7  9 (36%)    2  3  5 (45%)    14 (39%) 
 b. no  2  14  16 (64%)    5  1  6 (55%)    22 (61%) 










6.  “Do you regard this kind of protection as positive or negative?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
 a. positive  3  16  19 (76%)    6  3  9 (82%)    28 (78%) 
 b. negative  1  5  6 (24%)    1  1  2 (18%)    8 (22%) 
  4  21      7  4      36 
 
7.  “What is your gender?” 
 Neighbours   Tourists      Total     
Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
8  22  14  16  22  38 
30    30   60  
 
8.  “Which age category are you in?” 
   Neighbours       Tourists       
  Male  Female      Male  Female      Total  
 a. 15-20  1     1 (3%)    3  2  5 (17%)    6 
 b. 21-30  3  7  10 (34%)    2  4  6 (20%)    16 
 c. 31-40  2  6  8 (27%)    1  2  3 (10%)    11 
 d. 41-50  1  5  6 (20%)    3  2  5 (17%)    11 
 e. 51-60     4  4 (13%)    2  2  4 (13%)    8 
 f. 61-older  1     1 (3%)    3  4  7 (23%)    8 
  8  22      14  16      60 
 
9.  “How long have you lived or worked in the neighbourhood?” (only for neighbours) 
   Neighbours   
  Male  Female   
 a. 0-2 years  2  3  5 (17%) 
 b. 3-5 years     16  16 (53%) 
 c. 6-10 years  2  4  6 (20%) 
 d. 11 - longer  4  1  3 (10%) 











Interview with  Mr. Albert H. Mark, architect of City of Chicago Public Building 
Commission, and Mr. Thomas W. Vukovich, architect of City of Chicago Department of 
General Services. 
Date of interview: December 10th 2004 
 
The  City of Chicago Public Building Commission oversees  and helps to ensure the quality of 
facilities. It enhances education, safety and recreation in every community by building and renovating 
hundreds of schools, libraries, parks, police stations and other facilities. The PBC designs, develops 
and manages projects like state-of-the-art, crime-fighting police facilities to cascading fountains that 
become neighbourhood showpieces (City of Chicago Public Building Commission 2003). 
 
The City of Chicago Department of General Services is dedicated to supporting all City of Chicago 
Departments in the delivery of public services by providing clean, safe, and accessible buildings 
through efficient facilities and asset management. Their Bureau of Architecture, Engineering, and 
Construction Management undertakes construction projects that enhance the quality of life for 
Chicagoans by renovating and reconstructing health care and human services facilities, public safety 
buildings, and cultural institutions. It prepares the designs for all landscaping of city owned property 
(City of Chicago Department of General Services 2004). 
 
1.  Can you explain what the role of the DGS and the PBC is in the terrorist attack prevention 
task? 
DGS is more related to the maintenance and the upkeep of adjusting facilities. PBC builds the new facilities. 
We work hand in hand during the building of those facilities. Once it is done, it is only the task for DGS. 
 
2.  How and when did the task of terrorist attack prevention measures start? What were the 
main causes that this has to be done? Did “9/11” had any influence? 
It has always been our task. We stepped up on the surveillance and also it is tight into the central office, the 
‘911’. They monitor every city-owned facility in the city by central location. There was always a concern for 
security, but it certainly got stepped up after September 11th. 
Surveillance i s always foremost to attack or counter-attack the terrorism threat. Because you can build a 
castle, but if you have no surveillance, you would not be aware of threats. 
We have started with the installation of a lot of cameras, which has been picking up on our new facilities 
that the PBC does for us. Surveillance is the foremost for attack the entire terrorism. We place cameras in 
security-needing areas like street corners, and  also at facilities with special vehicular entrances and 
pedestrian entrances. You have to have key cards to come in. 
 
3.  Who decides if a building gets protected? Is it on federal or on state level? What is the role 
of the Department of Homeland Security? 
All of the above, as well as City government for city owned facilities and county for their buildings. The 








guidelines for the local government to follow.  Since 9/11 there is always a constant dialogue between 
Department of Homeland security and the city, in that frame of reference. The PBC and the DGS come up  
with the policies. The mayor does not want to close off city hall. People can come in here and are welcome 
here. You have to find a balance between making people feel welcome and not making it a fortress. 
 
4.  Are there any regulations for which building gets protected and which doesn’t? In which way 
does it has to do with the function and if it’s representative or not? 
There is no formalized policy for implementation.  In downtown they do a lot of things like installing 
bollards and other such things. They prevent vehicles from coming too close to buildings. It is something the 
GSA does. They formalize security procedures, for building facilities 
 
5.  Chicago is famous for its nice architecture, so in which way is aesthetics important? Or does 
it only have to be safe? 
Life safety is the number one priority. But aesthetics should always be taken into account. If you go around 
the downtown centre, like Daily Plaza, they put some nice planters and bollards. I want it to look pleasant 
(Mark). The benches of stone have been strategically put it there where there is no truck drive up. But at 
least, with the general public, when you look at it, it is very pleasant. You cannot really tell that it is a 
bollard. It is the most used plaza in the whole city; there are always activities there every day. That’s way it 
is important to make it so pleasant. Especially in downtown with so many high-rises, there is not too much 
open space where people can go during lunch hours and spend their time. 
 
6.  What makes you decide to make a temporary measure everlasting? 
When the threat is felt as a permanent one, then the measure has to become permanent, also. 
 
7.  Is there any cooperation with the Department of Planning and Development? 
Yes if it is a landmark designated building or structure. Otherwise it needs to be approved by other city 
agencies, such as Chicago Department of Transportation (CDOT), Department of Construction and 
Permits (DCAP), Chicago Fire Department, Chicago Police Department, etc. 
 
8.  Do you experience any resistance from the fire department or the police, because the 
protection measures may hinder them? 
Yes, they need to review, comment, and eventually approve the design. As long as we work together, there 
should not be any problems. 
 
9.  Do private buildings like the Sears Tower have to protect its property as well, or is it not 
mandatory? 
It is not mandatory but highly recommended. 
 
10.  Do you experience any interest of organizations like neighbourhood agencies in the terrorist 
attack prevention task?  
I am not aware of any. You may want to contact the Chicago Police Department or the Office of Emergency 






11.  Do you think citizens regard these measures as increasing their safety or as a constraint to 
move around? 
Both, but I think they understand the necessity of the situation. It is a mind-set they have established; the 
need to feel safe. 
 
12.  Do you agree with people who say that cities become fortresses because of these sorts of 
protection? 
Yes and no. Yes when aesthetics was not taken into account when anti-terrorism measures were 
implemented. No when the owner hires an architect to come up with a solution, stressing the importance of 












































Interview with Mr. H. van de Vet, responsible officer of the Department of Public Order 
and Safety of the municipality of The Hague 
Date of interview: March 23rd 2005 
 
The Department of Public Order and Safety of the municipality of The Hague is aggravated with 
controlling the police- and fire department and creates policy to combat crime, drugs problems, and 
violence on the streets. Also, it is responsible for combating terrorism. In reaching their goals and the 
execution of their tasks, they want to cooperate with the inhabitants of The Hague, which is translated 
into a safety plan called ‘A Safe The Hague: an assignment for all the inhabitants of The Hague’ (Gemeente 
Den Haag 2005). 
 
1.  Do you think The Hague is more likely to be a goal of terrorist attacks because it is the 
Dutch court and royal capital? 
The Hague is indeed the court and royal city. There are a lot of buildings with international functions, like 
the International Justice Court and foreign embassies and consulates. This might be the reason t hat The 
Hague experiences a heightened threat. And, it is the third largest city of The Netherlands.   
 
2.  What is The Hague doing to protect its city against terrorist threats? 
We are creating policy to make The Hague a better and safer city to live, and work in. Also, we protect our 
buildings which are at great risk of being attacked. Think about the different governmental buildings, the 
royal palaces, and the buildings with an international function, like the U.S. embassy at the ‘Korte 
Voorhout’.   
 
3.   Which department(s) is/are aggravated with this task? 
The Department of Public Order and Safety creates policy to make The Hague a safer city to live, and work 
in. But, at the end, the mayor is the one who is responsible.  
 
4.  Which buildings or objects are better being protected than ‘normal’ ones? 
The U.S. embassy at the ‘Korte Voorhout’ is an example of a protected building, although it is a temporary 
measure. The municipality would like to see them moving out of the inner city, but that is not what the 
embassy wants. They do not want to be banished into the outer meadows.    
 
5.  In which way has been tried to make the protection measures fit into the current cityscape? 
It makes a big difference whether you are in the design stage, or if you have to implement security measures 
in an existing situation. If you look at the U.S. embassy on the ‘Korte Voorhout’, those measures have been 
implemented afterwards. They had to fit into an existing situation. You will always see that. 
The difference lies within the design of the site around the protected object. In The Hague, we try as much 
as we can to take the existing situation into account. A good example is the site around the ‘Binnenhof’ and 
its security. This is the centre of power in The Netherlands, the prime minister, and the parliament are 
housed here. The site layout is decisive; whether you can solve it on a naturally way, or if you do not have 







From now on, in the early design stage of new buildings, the security measures are being fit into the plan as 
naturally as possible. The measures will not attract attention and being seen as a security measure directly. 
But, they are security measures indeed. 
  
6.  Are some parts of the city less accessible because of terrorism prevention? 
I am not aware of any. You will always see at places like the ‘Binnenhof’ that there is security when you 
want to enter this site. You are only allowed to enter, if you have an appointment. It is not accessible 
publicly by car, but for pedestrians it is.  
 
7.  Do you foresee the same protection measures as can be seen on the photographs taken in 
the U.S.A? 
I do not think that the measures as can be seen on the photographs from the U.S.A. will be implemented 
here in The Netherlands. Something has to happen first, before we are implementing measures like these.  
 
8.  Do you think these measures influence the appearance of a city? 
Yes, if you look at the measures as implemented in the U.S.A., no, if you look at the situation in The 
Netherlands. 
 
9.  Are you afraid of cities beginning to look like fortresses more and more because of such 
protection measures? 
The representatives of the nation want their meetings to be publicly accessible, so that people can visit their 
meetings. It is not possible to close the ‘Binnenhof’ hermetic. You have  to search for a balance between 
safety and the democracy constantly. It has to exist together. It shall always be the same consideration, so I 
do not see The Hague changing into an impassable fortress. 
 
10.  Do you think that these measures increase or decrease feelings of insecurity? 
The average citizen will not notice the measures. At best they realize that a certain spot used to be a parking 
place, which now is a place where flower boxes are placed. Feelings of insecurity are being measured here in 
The Hague on a neighbourhood scale. What can be seen is that people regard their neighbourhood as more 
safe than other unfamiliar ones. They do not know it so well, and do not know what is happening there. 
And, they think that someone else is always feeling more unsafe than they do their selves. It has to do with 
the unknown, which I think works for this kind of security as well. When you ask people about it, they will 
realize that it might be unsafe there, but it has little influence on their perception. This is the difference 
between objective and subjective safety. 
Only guards and attendants will feel more at ease with the security measures. They do not have to think at 
each car being parked what kind of car it is, what it is doing, and for how long it is already there. In case of a 
flower box, they do not have to make that consideration. Someone who has a clear vision on arriving and 
departing of people and cars will feel more safe. Only the people in the surrounding of a particular protected 
object can feel more unsafe and think that a car (with bombs) shall park in front of their building/object. 
 
11.  How do you foresee the Dutch situation in a couple of years? 
When a private party is implementing measures, it will feel more safe itself, but the neighbour shall 
probably feel more unsafe, because the cars shall be parked in front of his building, instead of in front of the 





Interview with Mr. D. Berg, responsible officer of the Department of Public Order and 
Safety of the municipality of Rotterdam 
Date of interview: March 30th 2005 
 
The Department of Public Order and Safety of the municipality of Rotterdam develops policy in 
mitigating danger and threat. Amongst their tasks is the implementation of physical protection. They 
create a guide for the analysis of safety and develop scenarios in case of emergency. In this way safety 
risks can be recognized in an early stage (Gemeente Rotterdam 2005). 
 
1.  What is Rotterdam doing to protect its city against terrorist threats? 
The most recent example of physical security is the security of Jewish objects. The murder of Van Gogh gave 
a lot of commotion, and we got a letter of a Jewish organization who wanted their synagogue to be better 
protected. It had protection by using bollards at the front, but not at the back of the synagogue.  
That letter was redirected from the office of the mayor with the request to solve this problem as fast as 
possible. We have good connections with the people who take care of this, so the bollards are already 
implemented at the synagogue.  
Because of this example, some other Jewish objects are being inspected by the police, to see if it is urgent that 
they get better (physical) protection as well. 
This inspection means looking at the situation, and see if it is necessary that it gets physical protection. Not 
only the physical situation is being inspected, but also the threat and the risk. The probability and the kind 
of consequences are also being taken into the final decision. 
 
2.  Which buildings or objects are being protected better than ‘normal’ ones? 
The synagogue in the neighbourhood called ‘Hilligersberg’ is interesting to see. And, there is a jeweller at 
the ‘Schiekade’.  An artist has painted these anti-ram bollards. 
At the beginning and the end of a shopping area, we place anti-ram bollards as well. And, together with 
some bank buildings, that is it for Rotterdam I guess. Nothing really spectacular. 
 
3.  In which way has been tried to make the protection measures fit into the current cityscape? 
In such a way that they are not too obvious. But, that is only possible when you build a new building. You 
can try as much as possible to make it fit into an existing situation, but you are dependent on the layout of 
the site. 
 
4.  Do you think these measures influence the way citizens use or see the city? 
We are not aware of any deregulations of pedestrian flows. We do not have ministries and almost no 
embassies here. And, if we have any, they are fenced off with fences. 
We do not have these physical security measures here in Rotterdam. We have those anti-ram bollards in 
front of jeweller shops in different sizes and forms. Those measures are also being implemented in shopping 





5.  Do you think that these measures increase of decrease feelings of insecurity? 
The anti-ram bollards will not have influence on feelings of insecurity, I think. If you look at the situation 
around the U.S. embassy in The Hague, it has influence. But, not more than people experiencing a 
threatening sphere. They do not like to walk around the embassy, that is all they experience.  
Except for the implementer itself, it will not have any influence I think. Or for the people who are involved 
in the situation, like personnel in a shopping area of at the embassy. Not for the normal public.  
I think, camera surveillance does have an influence. It is more visual and has more influence on some ones 
freedom of physical exercise. They see cameras all over the place, that might have an influence. 
 
6.  Are you afraid of cities beginning to look like fortresses more and more because of such 
protection measures? 
The Netherlands will not so soon become a fortress. We do not see such things here before something terrible 
happens here or in a neighbouring country. But, can we wait for that? That is your consideration. The 
societal pressure is not so high that we want, or need it. 
It is always a consideration when you talk about safety. At the one hand, you do not want anyone to enter, 
but you do want to enter yourself. The ‘Euromast’ has symbolic value. You cannot come close to it with a 
vehicle. I think it is protected by using a fence at 20 metres around the tower. The objects who really need 
protection are of a political and religious kind, and we do not have a lot of them in Rotterdam. 
 
7.  Are some parts of the city less accessible because of terrorism prevention? 
I am not aware of that. Only shopping areas are less accessible by car, but that is a normal situation in most 
of the inner cities in The Netherlands. 
 
8.  Do you foresee the same protection measures as can be seen on the photographs taken in 
the U.S.A? 
I think in The Netherlands we will not see such measures. Only more digital surveillance, instead of those 
measures as you can see on the photographs. Around embassies and ministries you will always have these 
measures. And, maybe it will increase a little, but no too much. First, something terrible has to happen. 
You just cannot implement so many measures that nothing will happen anymore, you have to be realistic. 
They will be implemented, that is for sure, but also because of traffic regulation, and for forcing back traffic 
out of inner cities. Time and money are also important factors in measures being beautiful or ugly. The 
sphere on Wallstreet is getting more and more embittered. It is not getting better. It looks like in Chicago 
they had more time and money to spend on implementing the measures. 
 
9.  How do you foresee the Dutch situation in a couple of years? 
Maybe, the threat will be moved by implementing security measures. If all the important buildings, like 
governmental, royal, and international ones are being protected, the terrorist will move to another, not yet 
protected, spot.  
It only ends if the attacker decides that he does not want to attack anymore. That is the only way to stop a 
terrorist attack. You can take every security measure possible, but at a moment that someone wants to 
attack, it does have the desirable outcome. He has fewer victims, and fewer damage, but the threat is turning 
back. Even if you make it a fortress, you cannot prevent a bomb from being placed. Actually, what is being 





Interview with Mr. M. Schilstra, responsible officer of the Department of Public Order 
and Safety of the municipality of Amsterdam 
Date of interview: May 11th 2005 
 
The Department of Public Order and Safety of the municipality of Amsterdam has developed a so 
called ‘alerteringssysteem’ which joins up to national policy. By using colour codes the citizens of 
Amsterdam will be kept informed about the threat level in Amsterdam. 
Also, an action plan called “Wij Amsterdammers” has been developed. This is meant to strengthen the  
fight against extremism and terrorism, by bringing the citizens together and learning scholars how the 
judiciary works, to create a larger unity in the end (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005).   
 
1.  What is Amsterdam doing to protect its city against terrorist threats? 
Here, in Amsterdam, we presume that an attack will take place anyway, and that is what we take into 
account during times of preparations. Not something on a special individual level. 
 
2.  Which department(s) is/are aggravated with this task? 
The police knows the vulnerable objects, and they have developed measures for those objects, which will be 
implemented by either the government, or by the company itself. It is not mandatory; it is their own 
responsibility, but in the end the mayor of Amsterdam is always responsible. Everything comprising public 
order happens on behalf of the mayor; he is responsible for that. The mayor will get an advice, which we can 
accept, or not. 
If a risk analysis shows that the risk is too high, than the measures will be implemented or will be adjusted to 
that. This is a consequence from the new ‘alerteringsysteem’. Some measures are attached to that, and that is 
why, in specific cases with a higher risk, those roadblocks are being placed. 
 
3.  Which buildings or objects are better being protected than ‘normal’ ones? 
Events are more and more protected against terrorist attacks. Last January Iraqi elections have been held in 
Amsterdam. The navy area was protected with security measures better than normally. A street has been 
partially closed off, a bus stop has been closed, and we gave out some prohibitions for cars.  
Also, Some Jewish organizations, like synagogues, and mosques, especially after the murder of Van Gogh, 
ask for better protection. Measures have been taken, after risk analysis.  
Certain persons, buildings or events can be selected as being ‘state domain’. For which the state is 
responsible. In the case of local domains, Amsterdam is responsible. 
 
4.  In which way has been tried to make the protection measures fit into the current cityscape? 
In principle, we try as much as possible to incorporate the measures into the existing situation. That is why 
you see the flower boxes so much. 
 
5.  Do you think these measures influence the appearance of a city? 
It is the mayor’s responsibility to disturb public life as less as possible on the one hand, but to maintain 
public order and safety on the other hand. But, the police aims at 100% safety. That is a consideration you 






6.  Do you think that these measures increase or decrease feelings of insecurity? 
It can have an influence on the users of affected areas, but not to an extreme extent. After the Iraqi elections 
we got a lot of letters from complaining citizens. They had to make detours, they had to park elsewhere or 
could not use the bus stop. You will always have to justify the decisions to the citizens and the media. As 
long as you explain it is for their own safety. 
 
7.  Are you afraid of cities beginning to look like fortresses more and more because of such 
protection measures? 
I do not think The Netherlands will change into a fortress. In Amsterdam one can see security around 
different buildings such as the Dutch Bank, but that is not very radical compared to the United States. 
 
8.  Are some parts of the city less accessible because of terrorism prevention? 
We will not see that, though sometimes temporary at events, like the Iraqi elections. Or just little parts like 
the situation at the U.S. consulate. 
 
9.  Do you foresee the same protection measures as can be seen on the photographs taken in 
the U.S.A? 
I think we will see those flower boxes as can be seen on the pictures from the U.S.A. That is exactly what 
one can see at the U.S. embassy in the Hague. And, maybe, we have those mounting road parts, but not in 
the near future, I guess. 
 
10.  How do you foresee the Dutch situation in a couple of years? 
That is a difficult question. It has two sides. As a government you have to make clear that you are 
implementing measures. And, some measures cannot be implemented invisible. You have to show that the 
government is taking its responsibility. It shall not be as extreme as can be seen on Wall Street, I guess. We 
have to think about safety more in the future, also at events like ‘Sail’ in coming August. In general, it can 





Overview of informal conversations 
 
Mr. Richard F. Ramsey; architect at Rogers Marvel Architects, New York City 
Date of conversation: November 23rd 2004 
 
Rogers Marvel Architects (RMA) seeks no stylistic label. Solutions are developed from a critical 
understanding of inherent project strengths and weaknesses; and are based on site conditions, 
political realities, material properties or budget constraints (Rogers Marvel Architects 2005). Their firm 
includes architects, graphic designers, industrial designers, landscape architects, preservationists and 
digital specialists.  
Among their projects is the redesigning of public space in the economical and financial district Wall 
Street and the business district Battery Park along the Hudson river. In redesigning public space they 
closed some streets or parts of sites, to prevent cars from entering, and by this means decreased the 
opportunity for a car to deliver a bomb next to a building at risk. 
 
Mr. Frank Uffen; urban planner at New Amsterdam Development Consultants, New York City 
Date of conversation: November 23rd 2004 
 
The New Amsterdam Development Consultants (NADC) is a group of professional consultants who 
combine both local and international expertise in real estate development and urban planning. They 
explore, create and export innovative strategies, master plans and cutting-edge development concepts 
(New Amsterdam Development Consultants 2005).  
They help clients defining development and investment strategies for urban markets, and manage the 
process of concept development, planning, design, and implementation. Their client profile consists of 
real estate developers, corporate clients, investors, institutional funds, government agencies, and 
development authorities. 
In Washington D.C. they have done a project in which a shopping centre asked for better physical 
security. They redesigned public space and implemented physical protection measures like benches 
and bollards.  
 
Mr. H. Croes & Mr. R. Geerligs; responsible officers at the Government Buildings Agency, The 
Hague 
Date of conversation: March 23rd 2005 
 
The Netherlands government is aiming at optimal quality of government housing. The task of the 
Government Buildings Agency (GBA) is to translate that goal into practice. It provides 
accommodation for government departments, independent administrative bodies and international 
organizations. Approximately 110.000 people work in buildings under the control of the GBA. In 
simple terms, the GBA ensures that these people have a pleasant workplace to enable the national 
government to function properly (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu 






prisons, and from monumental buildings till brand n ew offices. One of its most important and 
extensive tasks is maintenance, which includes safety and protection as well. The GBA’s philosophy is 
that a building is never solitaire, it always stands in a certain surrounding, and in an optimal situation 






Table with valuations of the variables in the analysis of the six different case studies 
 
  
Symbolic  Economic  Design of pro-  Harmony with  Effect for  Effect for  Create feelings  Effect for  
  
value  value  tection measure  surrounding  pedestrians vehicles  of insecurity  urban design
 Figure 5.4  +  +  +  +  -  -  0  + 
 Figure 5.5  +  -  +  +     +      -  0  + 
 Figure 5.6  +  -  -  -  -  +  +  + 
 Figure 5.7  +  +  +  +  -  -  0  0 
                 
 Figure 5.17  +  +  0  0  +  +  +  + 
 Figure 5.18  -  +  -  -  -  +  +  + 
 Figure 5.19  -  +  +  +  +  -  -  + 
 Figure 5.20  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  0 
                 
 Figure 5.23a, b  -  -  -  -  -  +  0  + 
 Figure 5.23c  +  -  -  -  -  -  +  + 
 Figure 5.23d  -  -  +  +  +  -  -  0 
 Figure 5.23e  +  -  -  -  -  +  +  + 
 Figure 5.23f  +  -  +  +  -  -  0  0 
 Figure 5.24a, b  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  0 
 Figure 5.24c  +  -  -  -  +  +  +  + 
                 
 Total amount '+'  11  5  8  8  5  6  6  10 
 Total amount '0'  0  0  1  1  0  0  5  5 
 Total amount '-'  4  10  6  6  10  9  4  0 
 
11 out of 15 examples from the U.S.A. have a symbolic value, and 4 not at all. 10 from 15 have an 
economical value. Most of the examples with a symbolic value, do not have an economical, and vice 
versa.  
In 6 examples there is no attention paid to the design of the protection measure, which corresponds 
with the 6 examples that are not in harmony with their surrounding.  10 and 9 examples do not have 
an effect for respectively pedestrians and vehicles.  5 and 6 examples do have a certain influence on 
respectively pedestrians and vehicles. 10 examples do have an influence on urban design, and 5 
examples are classified as neutral. This means that they have a certain effect, but not an obvious one. 
Mostly, these are the examples who are in good harmony with their surrounding and do not really 
look like being protection measures. They are pretty good integrated into the overall design of the site 






Symbolic  Economic  Design of pro-  Harmony with  Effect for  Effect for  Create feelings  Effect for  
   value  value  tection measure  surrounding  pedestrians vehicles  of insecurity  urban design
 Figure 6.1  +  -  -  -  +  +  +  + 
 Figure 6.2  +  0  0  0  +  0  +  + 
 Figure 6.3a  +  -  +  +  -  +  0  + 
 Figure 6.3b  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  0 
 Figure 6.3c  +  -  -  -  -  -  +  + 
 Figure 6.3d  0  0  +  +  -  -  -  - 
 Figure 6.3e  0  0  +  +  -  -  -  0 
                 
 Figure 6.5  +  -  +  +  +  -  0  + 
 Figure 6.6  -  +  +  0  +  -  -  0 
 Figure 6.7  -  +  +  +  -  -  -  - 
                 
 Figure 6.9  +  +  +  +  -  -  -  - 
 Figure 6.10  +  -  -  -  +  -  +  + 
                 
 Total amount '+'  8  3  8  7  5  2  4  6 
 Total amount '0'  2  3  1  2  0  1  2  3 
 Total amount '-'  2  6  3  3  7  9  6  3 
 
8 out of 12 examples do have a symbolic value, and 3 do have an economical value. In 8 examples 
attention has been paid to the design of the protection measure, and 7 examples from this are in good 
harmony with their surrounding. This means that one example who is designed properly, is not in 
harmony with its surrounding. Both designs do not correspond with each other.  
5 examples do have an influence for pedestrians, and only 2 examples influence the way vehicles can 
use the site or approach the building. 6 out of the 12 examples influence the urban design. 